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1 Introduction 
The recent wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq have been subject for a great deal of debates in 
political and public arenas, as well as academic circles concerning the use of Private Military 
and Security Companies (PMSCs). The two wars made visible the extended and rapidly 
evolving use of PMSCs in and around the conflict zones. Both conflicts showcased an 
unprecedented number of PMSCs involved in a conflict in modern times, which meant that up 
to 100,000 privately contracted personnel were operating in Iraq in 2006 (Merle 2006). To 
compare, the United States’ armed forces had 140,000 troops stationed in Iraq at the time 
(White & Ricks 2006). The kind of tasks that these private military companies carry out varies 
greatly and covers almost all kinds of tasks involved with conducting a large-scale, modern day 
military operation, ranging from logistics and maintenance of equipment to surveillance and 
protection-team operations (Singer 2008).  
Many tasks formerly thought of as tasks for the governmental military have also been 
outsourced to private companies. For example, the task of keeping safe the former Afghani 
president, Hamid Karzai, was outsourced to the American security company DynCorp who 
employed a group of former U.S. special forces troops for the job (ibid:17). The notion of 
former troops from both special forces and regular forces being utilized and hired by private 
companies is nothing unusual in the world of private military and security companies where 
many former soldiers have taken the leap from government to private companies. Another thing 
worth noting regarding the Iraq war and the use of private military companies is, that compared 
to the first war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, the war in 2003, and its subsequent peace-keeping 
mission, saw a 10-fold increase in the use of private military companies (Merle 2006), and it is 
in this time period the world first saw a change in the use of private military companies. 
The cold war era was a time of standing armies in huge numbers on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain (Singer 2008:49f). But when the Cold War ended in 1989, the demand for conventional 
armed forces fell dramatically, creating an exodus of soldiers whose service no longer was 
needed by their state apparatus. Other than an influx of unemployed soldiers, the end of the 
Cold War also created a change in the global political landscape where the neoliberal reform 
agenda became prevalent focusing on down-sizing the state, outsourcing of tasks and the 
application of cost-benefit calculations on all public services. At the core of neoliberal thinking 
lays the idea of privatization and outsourcing of what is traditionally regarded as responsibilities 
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of the state to the private sector. Examples of privatization are many and vary from privatizing 
entire sectors, such as healthcare or transportation, to outsourcing of smaller tasks, such as 
maintenance of public spaces.  
Practicing privatization has been accepted in varying degrees across the world and most 
governments rely on some kind of private company for an increasing number of their tasks. One 
sector of government, which in the public eye has never really been thought of as a potential for 
privatization, is the military. The military has, in a classic Westphalian-sense, been thought of as 
a profession radically different from other professions since it deals with organized violence, 
and is an embodiment of the state’s monopoly on violence, and the right to decide on life and 
death – all of which are deeply rooted in the foundation of the Westphalian-state. This 
distinction between the military and other sectors of government was summarized by the 
political scientist, Samuel Huntington, in the following quote: 
“Society has a direct, continuing, and general interest in the employment of this skill 
for the enhancement of its own military security. While all professions are to some 
extent regulated by the state, the military profession is monopolized by the state” 
(Huntington 1957:37).   
In this sense, the military is not only a unique profession and government sector, but also an 
image of the state’s monopoly on violence, and the idea of outsourcing this monopoly seemed 
irrelevant and even preposterous a few years back. But in the post-cold war era, however, the 
idea of the military sector crossing into the realm of private corporations has become a reality 
and a new, global industry has emerged (Singer 2008:9).  
The aforementioned cases with Afghanistan and Iraq exemplify a use of private military 
companies as an extension of the state’s armed forces, but there are several examples of PMSCs 
working as an army of their own or participate in training of regular government troops. A 
famous example of this is the role of the South African-based private military company, 
Executive Outcomes, in the civil-war in Sierra Leone where the revolutionary group RUF 
(Revolutionary United Front) spread havoc and terror across the country. And when everything 
seemed hopeless for the government of Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes was hired, and in a 
matter of a few months they had practically eliminated the 4-year long uprising (Singer 2008:4). 
In the Angolan civil war, PMSCs also played a major role where more than 80 different 
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companies participated on both sides of the conflict (ibid:9). The Sierra Leone case illustrates 
how weaker states can be drastically influenced by the availability of PMSCs, and the case of 
Angola exemplify how it is not only states that hire private military companies. In both cases, 
PMSCs have played a defining role in the shaping of governments and ultimately in shaping of 
countries as well. However, it is also important to keep in mind, that some of these PMSCs have 
also been accused of corruption and other scandals, as in Iraq in 2007, where 17 civilians were 
shot and killed by Blackwater contractors (Scahill 2007).  
When private companies, whose core objective is to turn a profit, become powerful enough to 
participate in, and conduct, warfare on an even level with state-armies, it alters the perception of 
what states are and how the relation between the state and civil society is constructed. The 
introduction of PMSCs shakes up the traditional understanding of civil-military relations and 
thus has the potential to alter our understanding of the state at a foundational level. A 
fundamental part of our understanding of the state is the boundaries of authority, and the growth 
of private military companies seems to reshape these boundaries. And if the boundaries of 
authority are changed, what happens to the rights of the civil society within these boundaries? 
Furthermore, the increased use of PMSCs is seemingly of global proportions which raises 
questions on whether it is part of a greater norm change within the state system, and if it might 
mean a change in our normative views on the state.  
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1.1. Overall research question 
How does the use of PMSCs influence the civil-military relations, and can this be seen as a global 
norm change in the state’s monopoly on violence, and if so, what are the possible consequences of 
such changes? 
 
This will be answered through the following working questions. These questions help us to 
structure the project. 
 
1.2. Working questions 
Chapter 4:  
1. How have PMSCs been used historically and how are they used today? 
2. How has the concept of state monopoly on violence historically been constituted vis-à-vis 
PMSCs? 
3. How has the negative connotations of mercenaries affected the use of PMSCs? 
4. How is the neoliberal world order today influencing the expansion and way that PMSCs are 
used? 
 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7: 
1. How can we understand the role PMSCs play in civil-military relations? 
2. What issues are raised in regards to civil-military relations in the use of PMSCs? 
3. What type of control is being exerted and how? (functional, political, and social) 
  
Chapter 8: 
1. Can the use of PMSCs (and the general privatization of security) be seen as a natural 
extension in neoliberal politics into the security field? 
2. What type of norm entrepreneurs are present in each case, and how do they affect norm 
change in terms of state monopoly on violence?   
3. Does the use of PMSCs imply a change in norms related to the Westphalian state project? 
4. How can states’ use of PMSCs be seen as part of a global norm change? 
5. What are the consequences of this norm change in regards to a change in the authority of 
the state? 
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1.3. Outline of project 
 
Chapter 2 
In this chapter we start out by going through the limitations and delimitations of the project. We 
then present our ontological and epistemological reflections. Additionally, we will go through our 
considerations in terms of collecting data, and source criticism. We will then systemize our 
understanding of civil-military relations, and how the concept will be applied in the project. 
  
Chapter 3 
In this chapter, we will develop our theoretical framework, which we will use for analyzing the 
changing civil-military relations. We start with looking at Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of fields, and 
particularly how we can operationalize the theory for examining how the security field has 
developed, with the (re)introduction of private agents within the security field. We will derive the 
theoretical concepts from Bourdieu’s theory, which can help us answer our research questions. 
We will then look at Saskia Sassen’s notion of a reconfiguration of the state, through globalization, 
as well as the idea of assemblages, specifically the assemblage of territory, authority and rights. 
Lastly, we look at Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory of norm change, to understand 
how we can view potential changes in civil-military relations as such. We look at their system of 
three stages of norm change, and how these can be utilized to examine our research questions. 
Chapter 4 
In this chapter, we will go through the history of PMSCs, starting with a short presentation of the 
concept of mercenaries and how their history, image, and negative connotations have impacted the 
view on PMSCs. We look at the relations between PMSCs and the concept of state monopoly on 
violence, and the origins of the monopoly on violence in order to understand how PMSCs can be 
seen as an outsourcing of this monopoly. We then examine how the neoliberal world order has 
affected the use of PMSCs, particularly with a focus on privatization, and how the neoliberal 
approach to security has influenced the rise of PMSCs. Lastly, we round off with a macro-level 
discussion of Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power, which we need in order to clarify the 
implications of conducting a Bourdieu-inspired field analysis on different levels. 
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Chapter 5 
In this chapter, we move on to our analysis of the first case, the private level, where we look at 
private oil and gas companies and their use of PMSCs for extraction sites in Nigeria. We start out 
by shortly introducing the case and outlining the conflict i.e. identifying the different agents and 
their roles. After this, we look at the types of control that the Nigerian state exerts over these private 
agents, and the possible complications and consequences hereof. On this foundation, we then start 
our field-analysis with a focus on doxic battles and authority/legitimacy. We end this chapter with a 
sub-conclusion that sums up how this analysis can help us to answer or main research question.  
 
Chapter 6 
In this chapter, we zoom in on the case of Iraq and the United States’ use of PMSCs here. The 
analysis is structured in the exact same way as in chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 7 
In this chapter, we look at the case of the UN’s use of PMSCs in East Timor. Once again, this 
analysis is structured in the exact same way as the two previous ones. 
 
Chapter 8 
Finally, in this chapter, we will relate our findings from the previous chapters to our main research 
question and expand upon this. We will look at the use of PMSCs in relations to a neoliberal doxa 
within the security field, to understand whether the use of PMSCs shows a natural extension of this. 
We will also look at how the changes caused by PMSCs can be seen as a global norm change, and 
particularly a norm change in the Westphalian state project. Last, we will explore what the 
consequences such changes might produce, such as changes in the relationship between territory, 
authority, and rights. 
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2 Methodological Considerations 
2.1. Limitations 
Our limitations in this project are important to reflect upon, because they affect empirical findings, 
data collection, as well as the theoretical framework used to answer the research question. We have 
little to no influence on these limitations, but they have still played an important role in the direction 
we have eventually taken, and are important to consider in order to understand any possible 
weaknesses of the project. This includes aspects that have not been possible to incorporate, due to 
lack of access, time constrains, and page restrictions. The main concern of this project is how the 
use of PMSCs influences the civil-military relations, and if this can be seen as a global norm change 
in the state’s monopoly on violence.  
 
In the applied literature, there are inherent limitations, in terms of the predominant use of secondary 
sources throughout the project. Incorporating primary empirical sources could have helped 
strengthen the main arguments of the project, but as mentioned, this was unfortunately not an option 
since most of this information is classified. Furthermore, we wanted to investigate what exact tasks 
the PMSCs in each case had been in charge of, with a special interest in armed provision. However, 
it also proved very difficult to obtain any reliable empirical data on this, which is most likely due to 
the legal aspect and classification of some of these tasks, which often seem to operate in legal grey-
zones that neither the PMSC nor their employees wish to bring attention to.  
 
In our case studies, empirical data and trustworthy sources have been hard to come by, which also 
means that in the private case, we had to rely on WikiLeaks documents from a secret source, posted 
by an activist group, which can be a questionable source for this type of material. However, we 
have used it scarcely, and made sure to back up the major claims with a country report on Nigeria, 
by Professor Rita Abrahamsen and professor Michael Williams, to establish credibility to the claims 
made in the case.   
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2.2. Delimitations 
When writing a project, it is given that certain related ideas will be excluded in terms of keeping 
with the objective of answering a specific research question and developing a strong and cohesive 
argument. These ideas have all been considered, but in some cases, they stray too far from the main 
focus and are entirely different projects in their own right. 
 
We attended several lectures with former Executive Outcomes’ founder Eeben Barlow, which was 
very useful in terms of gaining inside knowledge of how South African private contractors and 
PMSCs think and operate. However, since we are primarily concerned with British and US PMSCs 
as these are the main actors in our cases, we were not able to find relevance for this in our projects.  
Additionally, we have not concerned ourselves much with the debate over regulation and the legal 
aspects, such as the 2009 Montreux Document, which addresses PMSCs accountability and 
obligations under humanitarian law. As relevant and important as this aspects is, in regards to 
PMSCs way of conduct, incorporating this aspect into the project, would take up too many pages, 
and shift focus from the main research question. Examples of this are: PMSCs operating as (illegal) 
mercenaries; human rights abuses; scandals/corruption/regime change (Sandline, Excecutive 
Outcomes, Blackwater); and prosecution of both companies and individual contractors.  
In this project we focus on civil-military relations, meaning the relations between the civil power 
and the military institutions. We see civil power as consisting of both state and citizens, which is in 
line with the notion in Calhoun, of society as an object of analysis which is not reducible to just 
state or citizen (Calhoun 2001:1898). We do, however, see the civil society as being connected to 
the political, the two being overlapping spheres, which somewhat contradicts the understanding 
described by Islamogul, which implies that the civil society exists in a sphere outside the political 
domain (Islamogul 2001:1892). 
Another aspect, which has intentionally been left out, is how PMSCs differ from one another, in 
terms of expertise area, services offered, operational history and size/capacity. We have deemed 
these factors somewhat irrelevant in regards to answering our research question, which is concerned 
with a more overall analysis of where and in what situations private military and security companies 
are used, and how this privatization and outsourcing of security can be seen as a global norm 
change.  Furthermore, we do not focus much on what qualifications people must have to get 
employed by PMSCs, and also what kind of background check is conducted and how this differs 
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from company to company and state to state. This is of course an interesting aspect to investigate, 
because it concerns the morals and ethics of each PMSC. Additionally, we do not use much time on 
analyzing what kind of contracts and fees that are involved, when a PMSC is employed by a private 
company, a state or an international organization. This is mostly due to lack of access, this is not 
irrelevant in terms of civil-military relations, but unfortunately rather accessible.  
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2.3. Ontological and epistemological reflections 
In this project, we research how the use of private military and security companies affects civil-
military relations, as well as if this can be seen as a global norm change, and if so, what the 
consequences of this is. The foundation of our analysis builds on the idea of civil-military relations, 
which is based on the notion of a social construction of the civil power and the military institutions, 
and the relations between those two, as well as the concept of the monopoly on violence. In the 
following, we will reflect on how utilizing an ontological and epistemological social constructivist 
approach has influenced the development of our theoretical framework.  
 
Using an ontological social constructivist approach implies viewing society in terms of institutions, 
states, etc., as being imagined and conceptualized by social actors (Galbin 2014:82). This also 
means that there is no static, objective version of sovereignty, territory, authority and rights, but that 
understandings hereof are socially constructed (and re-constructed). The main concepts researched 
in this project are civil-military relations and state monopoly on violence. We view these concepts 
as social constructions, which receive their meanings through social and historical contexts.  
Civil-military relations are built on the concepts of the civil-power and the military institution. We 
see the civil-power as an amalgamation of the civilians and the state, wherein the civilians have the 
higher hierarchical status over the state. Hereunder, we view the military institution as a 
construction, created to protect the civil-power. Additionally, we see the state monopoly on 
violence as a socially constructed concept wherein the state hold the right to, and control over, 
force. This construction serves the purpose of maintaining the state’s sovereignty and power. 
Our epistemological reflections concern how we approach researching. As we understand our 
concepts as social constructs, we then also seek to understand where the power to define these 
constructs lay. In order to investigate our research question surrounding changes in civil-military 
relations, we develop a theoretical framework from Bourdieu’s theory of fields and Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s theory of norm change, as well as Sassen’s concept of assemblages, with relations to  the 
assemblage of territory, authority, and rights.  
In terms of ontology and epistemology, Bourdieu characterizes his work as ‘structuralist 
constructivism’ (Bourdieu 1989:14). When using Bourdieu in our theoretical framework, we 
understand his concepts of field, doxa, and capital as socially constructed, meaning that the 
definitions of a specific field, and the doxa and legitimations of capital within, all are constructs. 
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Our analysis aims to understand who holds the power of definition, meaning the power to legitimize 
certain forms of capital, and the power to define the doxa within a specific field.  
When utilizing Finnemore and Sikkink’s conceptualization of norm change, we do so with the view 
that norms are socially constructed, and through the stages of norm change, norms can be re-
constructed. As we try to understand changes in civil-military through the lens of norm changes, we 
view these as new constructions of norms and of state monopoly on violence, within the institutions 
related to sovereignty. We also seek to understand who holds the power to define these norms, and 
thereby construct and re-construct them, which in this theory is described as norm entrepreneurs.  
We utilize Sassen’s understanding of assemblages, specifically the configuration of territory, 
authority, and rights. We understand an assemblage as a socially constructed congregation of 
concepts, including territory, authority, and rights, which are all constructs.  
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2.4. Selection of Empirical Data and Source Criticism 
The data collection for this project has been focussed on finding data which helps to understand the 
use of PMSCs, including theoretical approaches, and empirical data on each of our cases as well as 
an overall understanding of PMSCs. It is important to note that due to the nature of the area, data 
concerning specific logistics and operations, as well as business contracts, have not been publicly 
available. As a result, our data is largely made up of secondary data. We have been aware that using 
secondary data has several disadvantages in regards to the control over quality. The type of data, 
and the origins of the data play a role in the quality hereof. In the following section we outline our 
reflections on the quality of our data.  
In the project, we utilize several academic articles, dealing with PMSCs, in order to find historical 
information in the use of PMSCs in addition to data on our cases. When collecting this data, we 
have reflected on the recognition of these journals as well as the authors.  
The project uses articles from several different media outlets. When selecting these articles, we 
have had certain reflections on which outlets to choose. We have assessed that the mediums we use 
are sufficiently reliable, though we maintain awareness of the fact that any journalistic article 
employs a journalistic method, meaning that there is a certain direction of story and some opinions 
or aspects might have been edited out. For this reason, we have tried to have critical selection when 
using articles and the information herein. 
Some of our data has been collected from official US and UN websites, as well as the PMSCs’ 
official websites. We have collected data from these sites concerning the use of PMSCs and the 
PMSCs own description of their services. We are aware that this data might not give the whole 
picture, which is why we have supplemented with data from academic analyses of our cases, in 
order to create a more detailed picture.  
Additionally, because of the limited public access to some of the specific case details, we have used 
data from a websites which has a specific activist agenda, such as Platform London, who has posted 
what they claim, are leaked (WikiLeaks) documents on Shell’s security spending and budget in 
Nigeria, and worldwide from 2007-2009. We unfortunately have no way of confirming if this data 
is authentic, but have primarily analyzed data, which at least one other source has confirmed.  
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2.5. Using Civil-Military Relations to Develop a Theoretical Framework 
In the following section, we will outline the concept of civil-military relations, and delineate how 
private military and security companies differ from state military. To understand how the use of 
PMSCs affects civil-military relations, we will utilize Joakim Berndtsson’s list of factors that 
influence civil-military relations when using PMSCs to understand the specifics of each of our 
cases. We will then look at the three types of control that Deborah Avant describes, to understand 
how the state enforces oversight over PMSCs operating within their borders. This will be explained 
and operationalized in the following section. It is on the foundation of these concepts that we 
develop our theoretical framework for analyzing changes in civil-military relations.  
2.5.1. The Civil Power and the Military Institution 
 
Our project deals with the relations between the civil power and the military institutions. The 
military as an institution has been created with the purpose of defending the state and its citizens. 
Essentially, the military functions as an extension of the social contract between the state and its 
citizens, which dictates that the state must provide security for the citizens. When speaking of civil-
military relations, we view the civil as the civil power, referring to the state and its citizens. Peter 
Feaver argues that the relationship between the military and the state is a paradoxical one, where 
“the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the 
polity” (Feaver 1996:149). He argues, that it is problematic that the military as an institution has to 
be powerful enough to do anything the civil power requests, while being subordinate enough to 
only do so (Berndtsson 2012:110). This also means that there is a hierarchy in the relation between 
the military and the civil power, where the civil power has the higher position, controlling the 
military (ibid.).  
Huntington argues that the military is constructed through two forces. First, a functional imperative, 
which he says pertains to defending the security of the society. Second, a societal imperative from 
social forces that is dominant in the society (Huntington 2002:2). These two imperatives must be 
balanced, as a military that is only guided by social values might not be able to perform its function 
properly, while a military lead purely by its functional imperative might be impossible to contain 
(ibid.). He also argues that, in regards to the American military, the main focus has gone from 
finding the best pattern of civil-military relations that fit with the liberal democratic values, to being 
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what pattern will best maintain national security (ibid.). We will look at how these imperatives 
come into play in regards to the use of PMSCs in the discussion chapter. 
2.5.2. Our Use of Civil-Military Relations 
 
Our research question pertains to whether PMSCs changes anything in civil-military relations, and 
if so, what they change. As we have outlined above, PMSCs have distinctly different characteristics 
and operate differently from the public military institutions. Accordingly, using PMSCs in place of 
public military will affect civil-military, by adding a new, corporate component to the relationship. 
This changes the constellation of the civil-power and the state military institutions from a binary 
relation to a ternary relation. This change can be seen in the figure below: 
 
Figure 1 - Adapted from Berndtsson 2012 by the authors 
As is evident from the figure above, adding a third component also creates new relations, meaning 
there is now civil-military, as well as PMSC-military and PMSC-civil relations.  
Berndtsson argues that introducing a third component in civil-military relations can have varying 
effects on the civil-military relations. These effects depend on a number of different elements that 
also make up the structure for each specific case. It is through these, inter alia, we can understand 
why the introduction of a new component in civil-military relations has stabilizing or destabilizing 
effects on the civil-military relationship. In each case, we will look at all these aspects, to 
understand the specifics of the case, and the structure of the civil-military-PMSC constellations.  
Berndtsson describes these as follows: 
• The type of company (military, security, or both) 
• The nature of the contract (what services will the company have to deliver) 
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• The type of client (is it a public or private client, a weak or a strong state) 
• The context in which the services are delivered (in war or peace, or as post-conflict 
reconstruction) (Berndtsson 2012:114). 
 
To understand the complexities of each case, we will look at the context that the PMSCs work 
within. We do this through the aspects listed above, in order to understand the elements that play 
into the changes that PMSCs creates in civil-military relations.  
First, we look at the type of client that is hiring the company. This is what differentiates the three 
cases, as each case concerns a private company, a state, or an international organization. We will 
also look at whether the state where the company is operating is a strong or a weak state. These two 
elements tell us something about the terms that the company is operating under, and the existing 
civil-military relations. Second, we look at the type of company or companies used, whether it is 
purely a security company, military company or a combination of the two. Third, we look at what 
services the company is contracted to provide, and what means of force they are allowed to use. 
Last, we look at the context in which the company has to operate, seeing whether it is in a peaceful 
country, a war-zone, or in a post-conflict area. All of these aspects, combined with concepts 
presented later by Bourdieu, Sassen, and Finnemore and Sikkink, will help us analyze the existing 
civil-military relations, and thus help our understanding of how these might change when a 
corporate actor is introduced. 
2.5.3. Types of Control 
Deborah Avant has identified three different dimensions of control of force, that can be used in 
relation to the instruments and use of force as well as the relationship between state actors and 
PMSCs: functional, political, and social control (Avant 2005:40). The functional control of force 
refers to the military’s ability to effectively defend the state’s interests through the use of force 
(ibid.:40f). The political control concerns acting within the boundaries of the dominant political 
structure, meaning that the military institutions allegiance to the civil-power is imperative- 
Meanwhile, shifts in the power structure will vary the political control (ibid.:41). Finally, social 
control of force relies on a certain fidelity to social values. Avant describes how the tools of force 
should then reflect the societal views on democracy, human rights, international laws, etc. Thus, 
social control of force varies in extent that the performance of security tasks reflects the dominant 
social values (ibid.:42). 
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In each of our cases, we will look at these dimensions of control, and how they are applied to the 
PMSCs, in order to understand how states deal with hiring and controlling PMSCs. Each dimension 
of control will tell us something about how the state controls the use of PMSCs, which in turn can 
reveal something about effects on civil-military relations.  
In terms of the functional control, we will to look at how the PMSCs in each case work together 
with the state military (or UN military). We do this, in order to understand the relationship between 
the two agents. If there is a lack of functional control, it affects the military-PMSC relations, which 
in turn affects the civil-military relations (Berndtsson 2012:120). The political and social control 
relate specifically to the civil-PMSC relations, and consequently the civil-military relations. To 
examine political control, we will look at how political oversight is being carried out, specifically in 
the hiring of contractors for the PMSCs, and in some cases the Rules of Engagement for the 
relevant country. This will help us understand how the civil power is regulating the PMSCs, and 
thus how their use is affecting the relations between the military and the civil power. Lastly, the 
social control pertains to how social norms and values are upheld. Specifically, it relates to whether 
the contractors are living up to the international social standards while carrying out their job. Lack 
of social control will affect the civil-PMSC relations, as well as the civil-military relations. 
Through these different aspects, we will be able to identify what challenges to the civil-military 
relations arise, when a third component is added to the relationship of civil-power and the 
institution of the military. We then utilize these findings to understand what changes in the civil-
military relations has taken place in each case, and whether or not these changes have been 
problematic.  
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3 Theoretical framework 
In our research of the privatization of security, we seek to understand the way that civil-military relations 
might change, when introducing a third party – a corporate actor – private military security companies. In 
this chapter, we will introduce a theoretical framework, which we feel is needed in order to look at civil-
military relations, and specifically, to look at how civil-military relations works together with a corporate 
actor. In order to do so, we will look at three different theoretical components: Bourdieu’s theory of fields, 
Sassen’s theory of assemblages, and Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory of norm change. First, we will go 
through each theoretical component and operationalize them, before operationalizing them together, in order 
to create our framework for the analysis and discussion. 
3.1. A Field of Forces and Struggles over Capital 
In the following part, we introduce the concepts of field, illusio, doxa, symbolic capital and power. 
These concepts are all explained theoretically and then operationalized to show how they are useful 
in our context. In the end of this part of the chapter, we summarize how the terms play together and 
how we will use them for answering our research question.    
3.1.1. Field 
In order to understand and analyze a field, we need to understand the relationship between the four 
elements that are key to Pierre Bourdieu’s field analysis: illusio, doxa, capital and symbolic power. 
Each of these elements together structure a field, and the nature of these elements vary from field to 
field. Therefore, each field is a relatively autonomous independent microcosm (Bourdieu 1994:4f). 
Each of the elements that structure the field is presented and explained below. The Bourdieusian 
understanding of a field is applicable both on a micro, meso and macro level, which means that 
there is more overriding fields on the lowest levels, and the number of overriding fields decrease at 
the higher levels. This means that there is a hierarchical structuring of fields altogether, while there 
is also a hierarchy within each field. This hierarchy is organized through volumes of (legitimate) 
capital (which we will return to later). 
As pointed out by Assem & Drent, Bourdieu’s understanding of a field also means that, because 
agents within the field are interconnected and hierarchically organized (on the basis of accumulated 
capital that is legitimized within the specific field), a ‘power shift’ within the field will result in a 
change for the field as a whole because the field is ultimately made up by its agents, their habitus, 
doxa etc. (Assem & Drent 2012:3). 
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Our application of the notion of a field is twofold: We look at the macro level – the field of 
international security – and investigate the power struggles that occur in here. Furthermore, in our 
case analysis, we treat each case as a field. In particular, we look at private companies’ use of 
PMSCs in Nigeria, the United States’ use of PMSCs in Iraq, and finally the UN’s use of PMCs in 
East Timor. These cases are different in the way that the agents (PMSCs) are working under the 
authority of different instances of legitimate symbolic ‘power-wielders’. This is interesting as these 
different authorities (private, state and international) are potentially changing the civil-military 
relations.  
The field is structured by the common idea, within the field, that there is something at stake, 
something over which power struggles are worthwhile. This is what Bourdieu calls illusio 
(Bourdieu 1991:8). As pointed out by Villumsen: “In general terms, what is at stake in any field is 
“the right to monopolize the exercise of ‘symbolic violence’” (Villumsen 2011:8). However, the 
specific nature of the illusio is field-specific. In the field of international security, the illusio would 
be the objective of an agent (be it private or non-private) to be in control of an event that calls for 
intervention. This also means to be in control over legitimizing that agent’s specific forms of capital 
(which is to exercise symbolic power).  
Illusio relates to field in the way that it is the center around which the field is structured. As noted 
above, illusio also relates to symbolic power, which in turn relates to doxa and symbolic capital.  
3.1.2. Doxa, (symbolic) capital and symbolic power 
Each field is also shaped by, and operating with, its unique doxa that is the common-sense belief 
system within the field that set out certain ‘rule for the game’ (Bourdieu 1991:9). Doxa is often 
metaphorically visualized as the set of rules of a game that shape the agents’ agency in the way that 
doxa is what distinguishes the legitimate from the illegitimate, the normal from the abnormal, the 
just from the unjust, the included from the excluded etc. (Andersen & Kaspersen 2007:359). At this 
point it is crucial to emphasize that doxa is not static but holds an element of dynamics (which can 
also be said about the field as a whole). It is dynamic because the agents within the field are 
constantly participating in (power) struggles. This does not mean, however, that the fields and doxa 
are in a constant flux – rather they evolve slowly over time. These power struggles are primarily 
about being (or becoming) dominant within the field, which means to be/become the agent that 
possesses the greatest overall volume of the type of capital that are valorized within the field 
(Bourdieu 1989:17).  
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The forms of capital that are legitimate on the field are also a matter of struggle (Andersen & 
Kaspersen 2007:360). This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as doxic battles (Villumsen 
2011:4). Doxic battles are most commonly taking place between the established, dominant agent on 
one side and the challengers of the doxa on the other side (Mérand 2010:52). These two (types of) 
agents are fighting for orthodoxy (the established) and heterodoxy (the challengers of doxa) 
(Andersen & Kaspersen 2007:360).  
 
These doxic battles are primarily discursive in their form, which means that the challengers will 
make their own strategic discursive ways of ‘securitizing’ a subject within the field, in a way that 
the challenging agent highlights the necessity of their particular form(s) of capital, be it economic, 
political or something else. The established agent(s) on the other side will fight these doxic battles 
by taking on a defensive discursive strategy that allows them to maintain their positions as the 
dominant agent on the field. Because the dominant is only dominant because they possess the 
highest volume of legitimate capital, their interest is in keeping that exact capital the most 
legitimate, whereby the dominant position can be upheld (Andersen & Kaspersen 2007:359). As 
Villumsen points out, capital is determining an agent’s hierarchical position within the field and 
therefore capital and the doxic battles are of utmost importance: “Capital is a ‘weapon’ or a ‘power-
base’ which can be used in struggles in a particular field.” (Villumsen 2011:3) Overall, doxic 
battles, in the field of international security, are battles over defining security through 
“communication and praxis” (Assem & Drent 2012:5).  
 
One could say that the agent, who comes out successful of this doxic battle, has won the right to 
exercise symbolic power, meaning they will have the monopoly over legitimizing symbolic capital. 
This is true on a micro, meso and macro level. 
 
We will specifically look into the way that these doxic battles take place in each of the fields stated 
above. Which agents are struggling over which forms of capital, and what are the consequences of 
such doxic battles? What happens to the civil-military relations when the doxa is changed as an 
outcome of doxic battles? Who is ultimately in control over the field (and doxa) with the 
introduction of private agents in a field (the international security field) historically dominated by 
state agents? These are questions that we will address in our analysis. In order to do so, we will 
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need a framework for analyzing what is at stake in these battles. This is where symbolic capital and 
power comes in play.    
 
When the different forms of capital, be it social, economic, cultural etc. are “perceived and 
recognized as legitimate” (Bourdieu 1989:17), they take the form of symbolic capital (ibid). The 
state plays a crucial role in this legitimization of capital: for example the economic capital, which 
only has a value because the (national) monetary system is controlled by the state, which functions 
as a guarantor of its legitimacy (Bourdieu 1994:5f). Bourdieu explains how symbolic capital and 
symbolic power work in this quote:  
 
“[…] [S]ymbolic capital is the form taken by any species of capital whenever it is 
perceived through categories of perception that are the product of the embodiment of 
divisions or of oppositions inscribed in the structure of the distribution of this species 
of capital. It follows that the state, which possesses the means of imposition and 
inculcation of the durable principles of vision and division that conform to its own 
structure, is the site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic 
power” (Bourdieu 1994:9).  
 
To elaborate on this, according to Bourdieu, the state’s ability to assert its monopoly over symbolic 
power (which is made possible because of its accumulation of symbolic capital), is being 
manifested primarily through the institutions of the state, with the school system being the most 
crucial instance of this consolidation. This is so because it is through symbolic power that the state 
exercises its “[…] power to make groups […]” (Bourdieu 1989:23), the power to define the order of 
things, and the power to impose its citizens with general ideological and/or religious visions and 
beliefs (ibid.).  
 
The state institutions make possible, through the constitution of grand ideas (both on paper and 
bodily), a general foundation of perception, the common ground from which we see others and 
ourselves. This is what Bourdieu calls ‘the principles of vision and division’ (Bourdieu 1994:13)  
 
Overall this means that all forms of capital, even social capital, (and the legitimacy hereof) can be 
traced back to the state insofar as it is the state that provides its population with modes of 
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communication, especially that of the written language (which is also a necessity to obtaining 
cultural capital), that allows them to socialize and hence to accumulate social capital. Consequently, 
the state holds the monopoly on symbolic power (i.e. the power to legitimize forms of capital) 
within its territory, and as long as it does so, the state plays an important role in the power struggles 
that is taking places within any given field. Maintaining the state’s monopoly on symbolic power is 
the illusio of the state as a field, and it is maintained through the institutions of the state, with these 
institutions essentially functioning as the indoctrinating system that makes people submit to a doxa, 
which leads to the people ‘accepting’ the established order of things (Bourdieu 1994:14). Doxic 
submission is taking place on a macro, meso and micro level, in all possible fields of practice, with 
the state (historically) being the highest instance of this capacity to exercise symbolic power.  
 
Concretely, the notion of symbolic capital and power is useful to us because it provides us with the 
needed theorization for analyzing how and if the field of international security (which includes 
PMSCs) can be interpreted as ‘norm-changing’. To analyze symbolic capital and power in our 
selected fields is also to analyze how and if a sovereign authority is challenged through doxic 
battles. What is particularly interesting for us here is what happens to the civil-military relations in 
the light of a potential power-shift within the field. It is also with a focus on this area, that Sassen’s 
ideas on change of authority will be incorporated later in the project.  
3.1.3. Summary and overall operationalization of Bourdieu’s contribution to our 
framework 
In general terms, then, symbolic capital, and the submission to a given doxa (orthodoxy) is 
essentially why people support governments, and support the big narratives and political ideas 
within a society, and why they become dominated. People even accept this domination, insofar as 
the people in general do not fight against the submissive force that have become so ‘normal’ that it 
has become unconscious for them to act according to the doxa in a more or less blindly manner. As 
Bourdieu puts it: 
“Doxa is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, when it 
presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view - the point of view of those 
who dominate by dominating the state and who have constituted their point of view as 
universal by constituting the state” (Bourdieu 1994:5).  
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The role of the state is of great importance, as we have seen. However, these mechanisms of 
struggle over symbolic power also occur on lower levels than that of the state. In every field, on its 
appropriate level, these struggles are taking place.  
 
To sum up, a field is a hierarchically structured space in which power struggles take place. The 
hierarchy of the field is determined by factors as volume of capital, and doxa, which defines the 
‘rules of the game’ i.e. the field and hence what capital is legitimate in said field. The reason for the 
existence of such a field is the common belief that there is something at stake, which is what 
Bourdieu coins illusio. The state functions as the guarantor of the legitimacy of the different forms 
of capital, and is therefore vital for the structuring of fields, and the organization herein. This is so, 
because power within a field is obtained through the accumulation of a doxa-specific form of 
capital, and as we have seen above, all forms of capital are legitimized by the state. The forms of 
capital that are legitimized, and thus convertible into symbolic capital, are a matter of struggle 
between competing agents. This is what we call doxic battles, which are power struggles that evolve 
around obtaining or maintaining the monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic power.     
 
Bourdieu’s theory is relational, meaning that each of his analytical terms i.e. field, doxa, illusio and 
capital cannot stand alone as they are intertwined and thus, to analyze a field such as the 
international security field to a degree where we are able to answer our primary research questions, 
we will have to include all of the terms explained in this chapter.   
Our use of this framework is double. We start out by conducting a general discussion of the security 
field, by reflecting on doxa-making capacities of strong vs. weak actors. This is followed by the 
case-specific analyses, where we zoom in on three different fields, one for each case, and treat them 
separately. This leads us to an analysis of the doxa within the fields and to the possible changes 
(doxic battles) that are occurring herein. As explained above, doxa is tightly linked to capital. We 
therefore need to investigate what forms of capital are legitimate in the fields, and how they are 
being legitimized. This analysis should provide us with a foundation for further discussing the 
changing civil-military relations with some support from Saskia Sassens framework on the relation 
between territory, authority and rights. What happens to these relational ‘concepts’ if the authority 
is being changed?  
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3.2. Territory, Authority and Rights 
For this project, we utilize Saskia Sassen’s theory on territory, authority and rights. Specifically, her 
take on what constitutes globalization is relevant to our subject, and how something considered a 
national entity could become one of global proportions. Additionally, the notion on how very local 
entities traditionally confined to the nation-state, can interact with placeless entities and thus 
reconfigure, or even create, their own systems (Sassen 2008:62). 
Our project design is structured around analyzing three different cases of outsourcing of security 
operations, each to its own degree in relation to the state. What is similar to all of the cases is that 
they all are regional specific but originate in trans-national structures. Common is also that the state 
plays a role in each of the cases, and how tasks previously naturally regarded as tasks of the state 
are being outsourced to private actors. However, Sassen does not see this as a weakening of the 
state but rather that the state plays a significant role in constituting a framework for what makes 
globalization possible. Sassen identifies three aspects of what constitutes the development of 
globalization: disassembly, development of capacities, and re-assembly. Disassembly regards the 
transfer of tasks previously accredited to the state, to private actors. The development of capacity-
aspect relates to the development of the private actors that allows them to operate on a global level, 
and reassembly is where the new private actors become part of global assemblages that are 
embedded in the national but operate on a global level. Sassen argues that this kind of development 
is not something that replaces older orderings of state structure, but rather something that will 
coexist with older orderings, just as various interstate systems coexist with a traditional state system 
(Sassen 2008:63).  
Nonetheless, the emergence of new orderings in systematic structuring of state and society implies 
rather tremendous consequences for the existing orderings (Sassen 2008: 63). The process of 
creating a system where new and old orderings can coexist is what constitutes a reconfiguration of 
the state does not necessarily mean a decline of the state, but it does mean a change of order for the 
state (Sassen 2008:71). Sassen, thus, argues that the state becomes a site for transformation of the 
relation between public and private, and reconfigures the global system in which the state functions 
(ibid.). This transformation is manifested through the relation between three aspects of society, 
which Sassen sees as essential and transhistoric: territory, authority, and rights (Sassen 2008:68). 
The three aspects become institutionalized, to a varying degree, through processes, struggles, and 
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competing interests (ibid.), and the formation of the three aspects varies depending on where they 
are located, i.e. public-private or national-transnational (ibid.).  
3.2.1. Operationalization 
All of our cases, each to their own degree, are examples of a disassembly of the state and a global 
assemblage wherein the state plays a significant role. Within this, an underlying idea of how global 
structures are founded in national structures is prevailing, and this is also relevant to our study of 
our cases.  
Our operationalization of Sassen theory works well with including Bourdieu into our project. 
Sassen’s notion of denationalization and the following reconfiguration of the state and the power 
structures within the state, relates to Bourdieu’s idea of doxic battles and the power struggle it 
symbolizes. The transformation of the relation of public and private can be seen as a doxic battle, 
where the public would be the established doxa and the emerging private actors is the challengers. 
Furthermore, the very idea of privatizing and denationalization can also be regarded as a doxa in the 
political field. Bourdieu’s concept of fields is also something that can be related to Sassen, in the 
way that assemblages can create their own prevalent orders that coexist with orders on a larger 
scale. Similarly, each field operates with its own doxa but exist in a larger, more general field with a 
potential different doxa.  
Another way the concepts in Sassen theory will be utilized in this project is through the 
configuration of territory, authority, and rights. The formation of these three aspects is what can be 
defined, in our project, as the civil-military relations, and what we wish to examine is the impact on 
this very formation when private actors are introduced. Any alteration in the formation of territory, 
authority, and rights will have an impact on how civil-military relations are constructed. Especially 
the aspect of authority will play a significant role and how a changing authority alters the relation 
between the military and civil society and how this affects the rights in the civil society. 
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4 Norm Change 
In this project we wish to examine how the emergence of PMSCs affects the state’s normative 
monopoly on violence, with a focus on changes in territory, authority and rights. To do so, it is first 
necessary to provide a description of how (international) norms are constructed and become 
acknowledged and (re)defined by powerful actors. These definitions will be applied in our final 
discussion based on the three case analyses, which will provide leverage to the discussion on 
whether or not there has been a global norm change in the security field, and if so, what the possible 
consequences of this might be. We will primarily operationalize definitions by Finnemore & 
Sikkink.  
There are different interpretations of a specific norm, on the private, national and international 
level, but common for all three levels is that norms basically refer to “appropriate standards of 
behavior” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:891). And it is these appropriate standards of behavior, 
which also relates to Bourdieu’s definition of doxa, in terms of the security field and the global 
security sphere, that we wish to analyze. 
Since 1648, the Westphalian sovereignty has been the dominant norm in international society and 
was established by the dominant European (state) actors, with the purpose of upholding order (and 
security) in the international society (Croxton 1999). Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink 
distinguished between the constructivist’s political science definition of a ‘norm’ and the 
sociologist’s definition of an ‘institution’, which is often seen as synonymous, but the terms refer to 
different degrees and types of behavior. Finnemore and Sikkink describe this, saying: 
“One difference between "norm" and "institution" (in the sociological sense) is 
aggregation: the norm definition isolates single standards of behavior, whereas 
institutions emphasize the way in which behavioral rules are structured together and 
interrelate (a "collection of practices and rules")” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:891).  
We emphasize both definitions, meaning that we see sovereignty as a long-standing dominant norm, 
with regards to the states’ monopoly on violence. This means that: “only states and their armed 
forces may legitimately and legally exercise coercive force for purposes other than self-defense.” 
(Krahman 2013:54). 
Several scholarly disciplines have acknowledged different types or categories of norms and in 
regard to this, Finnemore and Sikkink writes: 
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“The most common distinction is between regulative norms, which order and 
constrain behavior, and constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests, or 
categories of action” (Finnemore& Sikkink 1998:891).  
It is primarily the constitutive norms that we wish to examine further, in terms of how new private 
security actors (PMSCs) can be seen as adding a new angle of interest and action to the traditional 
civil-military relationship, when it comes to outsourcing of violence from the state to the private.  
 According to Krahman, norms are always in the process of being (re)defined by norm 
entrepreneurs (ibid.:895). When it comes to international security norms, these first movers have to 
be powerful actors that can lead the way for others to follow. This norm (re)defining has according 
to Finnemore and Sikkink, three stages, which starts with norm emergence, where the powerful 
actor, wanting to change an established norm, attempts to persuade other actors to adopt new norms, 
which leads to the norm cascade stage, where the norm cascade/norm entrepreneur seek to socialize 
other state actors into the new norm, the so called ‘norm bandwagoning’.  This involves a 
combination of pressure for conformity and a desire to enhance international legitimization (ibid.:). 
Finally, norm internalization takes place, which occurs when norms take on a taken-for-granted 
quality, and is no longer a matter of broad public debate, which means that the norm has become 
‘normalized’ and integrated (Krahman 2013:56).  Additionally, three factors encourage norm 
transformation: “Prominence, precedent and coherence” (ibid.). These are related to the idea that a 
new norm can gain international acceptance, if a significant number of powerful states support it.  
Furthermore, it is spread when “actors see others behaving in a certain way and copy those 
behaviors” (ibid.).   
4.1.1. Operationalization 
 We will operationalize Finnemore and Sikkink’s definitions of norm emergence, norm cascade, 
(norm entrepreneurs) and norm internalization. These will be used to discuss the origins and 
emergence of international security norms based on our case analyses. Furthermore, these will be 
used to discuss the processes through which new norms and norm entrepreneurs influence state and 
non-state behavior, and which security norms that seems to matter and under what type of 
conditions. Finally, we will use these definitions to gain an understanding of who the dominant 
norm entrepreneurs are on the private, national and international level, as well as understand their 
agenda of establishing global security norms, and also what the possible consequences of such 
establishment has been, and might become in the future. These findings will also be used to discuss 
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where the nation-state fits in within the neoliberal world system, and in what way the privatization 
of public goods has affected the state sovereignty and its normative monopoly on violence.  
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4.2. Summary of our Analytical Framework 
Based on this chapter, we will now summarize our analytical framework. We combine each part of 
the framework and then formulate what the contribution of each part of the framework is, for 
answering our main research question.   
All parts of the framework revolve around a change in civil-military relations. Each part then 
provides us with ways of understanding these changing relations. Furthermore, each part 
supplements each other. 
We use the concepts of field, doxa, capital, symbolic power and the struggles over this, in order to 
be able to analyze changes within the fields that we are interested in. These fields are those of 
international security (macro), and inside of this field (meso), we treat each of our three cases as 
separate fields. This opens up for a discussion of authority and legitimacy, which provides us with a 
foundation for discussing possible changes in civil-military relations. In this way, the Bourdieusian 
part of our framework functions as the theoretical foundation for answering our main research 
question, which means that TAR and norm change supplement the Bourdieu part. This means that 
TAR and norm change primarily relates to civil-military relations through the Bourdieu part of the 
framework. Therefore, we turn to Sassen’s operationalization of TAR in order to supplement the 
field analysis, specifically where our analysis leads us to the topic of authority (Bourdieu’s 
symbolic capital and power) and the aforementioned possible changes within the field(s). Here we 
look at the relationship between territory, authority, and rights to add a consequence-perspective to 
our field analysis, as the Bourdieu-framework provides us with little capabilities of touching upon 
what the field-changes mean for the civil-military relations. In short, we use TAR to expand on our 
field analysis so that we can use this to answer our main research question. Finally, we then use the 
concept of norm change to analyze and discuss whether these changes in the field(s), caused by the 
introduction of private agents, can be seen as norm changing with regards to how authorities make 
use of PMSCs. Basically we use norm change to put together our different pieces of the analysis to 
discuss how and/or if these changes to civil-military relations can be seen as a norm change (on a 
global scale) and what this means for the civil-military relations and TAR. This perspective allows 
us to identify the agents that are capable of changing norms (which relates to doxic battles) and 
understand the roles of these agents in the reconfiguration of the field(s) that take place namely 
because of the introduction of a private component into civil-military relations.   
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5 Historical and Theoretical Context 
This chapter is divided into two contextual parts: a historical one followed by a theoretical one. The 
historical context is base on a chronological description of mercenaries role in society since 1648 
(and just prior to this), with a focus on the post Cold War period up until today. The purpose of 
providing a historical context of PMSCs, is to create a foundational knowledge of how society has 
used and viewed PMSCs (or mercenaries) in the past and now, and what role they have played in 
regards to state monopoly on violence. This section also focuses on the Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty, which has had great impact on international norms since its establishment. After 
PMSCs historical context, we present and incorporate Bourdieu’s theoretical perspective, which 
describes the macro-level system in which both public and private military operates. The purpose of 
presenting this is to apply this structural-framework as an overall macro-perspective from which we 
will approach our three cases, from the top and down to a meso-level. Together, the historical and 
theoretical contexts supplement each other, by providing a comprehensive structural context, which 
will be used as the foundation for the three analyses.  
5.1. Historical Background on the Use of Private Military and Security Actors 
To be able to understand, analyze, and discuss PMSCs influence on civil-military relations and 
normative changes, one must first take a step back and reflect upon the historical background 
associated with PMSCs. Firstly, this section starts by presenting the concepts of mercenaries and 
how PMSCs relate to the concept of state monopoly on violence. Secondly, we will look at the 
origins of the monopoly on violence in order to understand how the use of PMSCs can be 
understood as outsourcing of this monopoly. Thirdly, we will look closer at how the history, image, 
and negative connotations of mercenaries have influenced the view on PMSC-use. Fourthly, we will 
look at how the neoliberal world order affects PMSC, especially with focus on privatization in 
general and how the neoliberal approach to security has influenced the rise of PMSCs. From this, 
we will argue that private security and military actors has always played an important role in states’ 
power and authority, and that re-appearance of PMSCs is neither coincidental nor surprising given 
their history. However, what is particularly interesting is how the spread of neoliberalism, which 
started in the 1970s (Harvey 2005:2f), but especially since the mid-1980s and the end of the Cold 
War, has acted as a foundational structure for the rise and re-shaping of private security and military 
actors in contemporary peace- and conflict zones. And lastly, we will account for the theoretical 
approach surrounding the historic development, thus defining how we will approach our different 
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case analyses. This will be done by examining the macro-level system that private and public 
military are a part of in the light of our theoretical background. 
 
5.1.1. The Rise and Fall of Mercenaries Prior to 1648 
The idea of soldiers for hire is not one that only belongs in modern warfare, but rather has a long 
and somewhat dark history. It highlights the fact that the state has not always had the sole 
monopoly on violence, but rather states and rulers have relied heavily on private actors as 
components of building societies, empires, and states (Mandrup 2012:9). P.W. Singer describes, 
that prior to 1648 “[…] the conduct of violence was a capitalist enterprise […] war became the 
biggest industry in Europe” (Singer 2008: 28). This meant that during the Thirty Years Wars (1618-
1648) most of the countries in the world had military made up entirely of mercenaries (ibid.: 29). 
The dictionary describes a mercenary as “a soldier hired into foreign service” (Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary 2015), however, this is a somewhat broad definition and Singer argues that the Geneva 
Conventions provides the most accurate definition of a mercenary: 
 
“[…]a foreign person who, despite not being a member of the armed forces in the 
conflict, is specifically recruited in order to fight and is motivated essentially by 
private gain” (Singer 2008: 41).   
  
A mercenary’s loyalty is based on a contract, and therefore differs from soldiers, who fight for their 
country, families and homes. A distinction Berndtsson also makes in his definition of soldiers and 
private military contractors (see chapter 2). Another important distinction that has given 
mercenaries a bad reputation, is as Singer describes it, the fact that “soldiers often serve to prevent 
wars, mercenaries require wars” (Singer 2008:41) to make a living which means abandoning all 
morals in war. This is also one of the strongest critiques of today’s modern mercenaries, which 
PMSCs are often described as.  
Later in this chapter, we will discuss the definition of modern day mercenaries, but to do so, we 
have to take a step back in history, and provide a description of the dominant international paradigm 
since 1648, based on state sovereignty. This is an essential key in the analysis of the global 
normative development that arguably has taken place within the past three decades.  
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5.1.2. The Significance of the Peace of Westphalia 
The Thirty Years Wars ended with the establishment of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, where 
state sovereignty won out against that of empire, and has since been accepted as the core 
principle/norm in the international society (Singer 2008:29). This new world system relied on a 
system of independent states abstaining from interfering in each other’s domestic affairs and 
checking one another’s ambitions through a general equilibrium of power (Kissinger 2014:3). 
Additionally, this meant that “[i]n assuming control over its territory, the state undertook to protect 
its lands and people with public forces” (Buzatu & Buckland 2015:7), which was the beginning of 
states developing what Max Weber refers to as the “[…] monopoly on the legitimate means of 
violence” (Andersen et al. 2007:8). It was in the wake of the sovereign establishment, that the state 
began a takeover of the military market, and the hired foreign armies started to be replaced by 
standing state armies made up of citizens (Singer 2008:29). This meant that mass state armies 
overtook the security field, and was therefore both the reason and outcome of the organizational 
form of the state. The size of the army started to matter more than expertise knowledge, because 
having a large army meant that it was possible to take more land by force, and therefore symbolized 
a greater power of the state (Singer 2008:30). Additionally, the invention of gun powder and 
muskets meant that the special skills of the mercenaries were no longer needed, because any person 
could pull the trigger, which therefore resulted in a decline in the use of specialized private military 
actors (Singer 2008:29). 
 
During the centuries that followed the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the dominant normative 
framework of the international system, has regarded  
 
“[…] the legitimate use of violence as being the domain of the modern state, which, as 
a natural consequence, delegitimizes non-state providers of security. Legitimacy is, 
therefore, tied to the formal state” (Mandrup 2012:8).  
 
Therefore, when referring to the states monopoly on violence or rightful use of force it means that 
this is seen as an inherent function of the state, and therefore also as an expression of state authority 
and right. The idea of the state’s monopoly on violence is therefore strongly tied to the concept of 
sovereignty, and implies that the military as a state institution is responsible for the practical 
provision of national security as portrayed in traditional civil-military relations. However, it is 
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important to keep in mind that looking back at history, the state is a rather new construct of 
governance, which drew its public power from the private market of violence (Singer 2008:20). 
This argument can also be found in Charles Tilly’s claim that there is an analogue between war and 
state-making, meaning that wars are the makers of states (Tilly 1985:185). 
Therefore, when looking closer at the history of PMSCs, it becomes clear that these private military 
and security actors seem to thrive in periods of systemic transformation, or fragile-states. According 
to Singer, this was evident when: 
 
“Governments were weakened, powerful military capabilities … were available on 
the open market, and transnational companies were often the most efficiently 
organized actors” (Singer 2008:20). 
 
 Furthermore, Singer emphasizes other factors in history which has given rise to mercenaries such 
as when quality matters more than quantity, meaning a demand for specialized tasks as well as “the 
complimentary relationship of mass military demobilization in one zone to new wars in other 
weaker state zones” (ibid.:38). When comparing these historical components to the post-Cold War 
period, many of the factors are found repeated and it can therefore be argued that this has created an 
ideal international system for modern day mercenaries to reemerge and thrive.  
5.1.3. The Rise of Neoliberalism – The End of the Cold War  
During the Cold War, there was a focus on great power status and nuclear competition between the 
US and the USSR, and the security order was strongly tied to the idea of state sovereignty, which 
Anna Leander writes:  
 
“[…] made (international) security appear as a quintessentially public responsibility 
to be provided through practices as the arms race, diplomacy, alliance-building, 
containment, border control and policing. With the end of the Cold War this changed” 
(Leander & Munster 2006:6).  
 
As Bjørn Thomassen writes, “a regime change took place around the globe with the end of the Cold 
War and Communism” (Thomassen 2012:681), giving further impetus to neoliberal processes of 
privatization and outsourcing, which accelerated processes of globalization. This development 
continued to expand during the 1990’s where “[T]he capitalist marketplace had been proclaimed 
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with the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and enthusiasm ran high for national economic 
deregulation and privatization […]” (Tsing 2000:331). Therefore, security order and sovereignty 
could no longer be considered fully inseparable from one another, and on a global scale states 
started outsourcing public-owned institutions to the private sector which were areas that had 
previously associated with the welfare state (Berndtsson 2012:116). As Michael Lang points out, 
the image of globalization made “neoliberals praise its free markets, social democrats bemoan its 
undermining of the welfare state, [and] Marxists critique its capitalist dominance” (Lang 2006).  
Berndtsson argues that the state outsourcing of public to private is a reasonable and logical step in 
the direction of states wanting to attain more effectiveness by downsizing the public sector 
(Berndtsson 2012:116). Furthermore, this re-appearance and expansion of private military and 
security actors has been highly influenced by a growing demand for military skills since the end of 
the Cold War – demands from different sides, such as states that had formerly depended on Cold 
War consumers. After the Cold War, these patrons started looking to PMSCs in the attempt to 
facilitate internal stability and security. Additionally, those states that incorporated the neoliberal 
discourse in terms of down-sizing the public goods wanted to restructure and optimize the little 
military they had left, and therefore sought out private military experts to carry out this agenda 
(Avant 2005:31). All these factors combined, (re)opened a market of violence with a re-invention, 
rebranding, and commercializing mercenaries as private military and security contractors. As Singer 
describes it: 
 
“In the wake of globalization and the end of the Cold War, the private military market 
has expanded in a way not seen since the 1700s. It has also been relegitimized to an 
extent, or, at least, opened back up to allow a nearly public trade” (Singer 2008:40).   
 
This follows Raewyn Conell’s arguments that as globalization spread, so did its (privatizing) 
business discourse with claim about the declining power of the national state and the rising power 
of the neoliberal market (Conell 2007:375). 
5.1.4. Modern Day Mercenaries 
The Geneva Conventions essentially criminalized mercenaries, and removed the legal protection of 
soldiers in war (Krahman 2013:7), which led to the prosecution of many “[…] freewheeling 
mercenaries and filibusters” (Singer 2008:43), who had previously enjoyed operating under the 
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same license as soldiers. However, this did not mean the end of the hired soldier, but rather a need 
for renewal and rebranding. The old fashioned mercenary-trade went underground and transferred 
to an individual level, and still operate in areas where the legal system and governance is weak or 
broken, such as the Kosovo war, where many mercenaries were hired into rebel groups (Singer 
2008:43).  
 
Contrary to these traditional mercenary ways, PMSCs have chosen to embrace the global neoliberal 
development, and has become mainstream in a sense, as commercial enterprises “[…] that trade and 
compete openly (for most parts) and are vertically integrated into the wider global marketplace” 
(Singer 2008:45).  
This also means that PMSCs are a profit business, much like mercenaries, but in a much more 
sophisticated (and legal) way by functioning as registered trade units, and can make use of intra-
firm trade. Whereas mercenaries operate on the black-market for individual gain, only trusts cash 
payments, and cannot be trusted or held accountable for anything more than short-time agreements 
(ibid.:46), PMSCs operate in foreign countries under contracts of legally registered companies, and 
that way operate in a legal vacuum. However, there is still much debate on what exactly sets 
PMSCs apart from mercenaries. Despite PMSCs going mainstream they are often still hard to tell 
apart from traditional mercenaries, especially when it comes to issues of prosecution and 
accountability, which is a very heated topic that has been debates since the 1990s.  
 
Especially PMSCs such as Blackwater, Sandline, and Executive Outcomes have caused an 
international stir in terms of the legitimacy and legality of private contractors use of arms (Krahman 
2013:53). Additionally, there have been a lot of concerns about accountability, especially putting 
private contractors on trial, which has been very difficult in the past. As an example, it was not until 
2015 that the first private contractors were convicted for the Blackwater scandal in Iraq in 2007, 
where 17 civilians were killed by private contractors (Hsu & Martin 2015). Dr. Abdel-Fatau Musah, 
director of Political Affairs at the Economic Community of West African States, has made the 
following claim about modern day PMSCs “[…] private military companies are nothing but the old 
poison of vagabond mercenaries in new designer bottles” (Singer 2008:44). Whether this claim is 
true or not, PMSCs have not been able to detach themselves from association with mercenaries, 
which has also caused much international suspicion and media prosecution. Despite this, PMSCs 
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seem to thrive in a globalized world, driven by a neoliberal dogma where outsourcing of public 
goods to the private sector has started to become the rule rather than the exception.  
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5.2. Theoretical Context 
At this point, we will turn to our theoretical background in order to further our approach to our case 
analyses. While the historical background above accounts for what has led to the point in history 
that is today, the following part will, through our theoretical background, investigate the macro-
level system in which both public and private military operates. As such, the operationalization of 
our chosen theories will come into play here, helping us to setup our macro-perspective on our case 
analyses. This perspective serves as an overall perspective from which we will approach our three 
cases, down onto a meso-level. 
It is important to reflect on the relationship between level of the field and degree of 
autonomy/relativity: while fields on the lower level might hold the conditions for being more 
autonomous than their superior counterpart, the power struggles within fields at the lower level are 
much less likely to be able to influence the doxa of a field on a higher level. This is important in 
conjunction with our different scopes throughout this analysis. When we operate on a macro-level, 
we treat the state as the agent that exercises symbolic power – the power of doxa making. However, 
on the macro-level the state and its doxa is also more directly threatened or challenged by other 
agents who operate at the same level. This means that the higher we move towards the sovereign – 
be it a transnational or state agent – the more is at stake. However, fields on the higher levels might 
be more bound to the universal doxa (of the state for instance) while having greater influence 
hereon. This can be thought of as ‘doxic spillover effect’ that decreases the further we move 
towards a micro-level (with the state (macro) being the source hereof). The volume of accumulated 
legitimate capital determines the impact of power struggles/doxic battles. The total volume of 
capital within a field is somewhat coherent with the size of the field which is why the ability to 
challenge higher fields’ doxa, is greater on higher levels and less on the lower levels, because the 
ability to do so is to hold symbolic power, which can only be done through possession of symbolic 
capital. This also applies to inter-state relations, where ‘stronger states’ i.e. states who possess 
greater volumes of legitimate forms of capital and thus has a ‘stronger’ symbolic power in the way 
that it can more easily affect weaker states. Because we live in the age of neoliberalism, it is 
important to see the rise of this system as a doxic battle that is taking place on a supra-national 
level. 
However, the relationship between volumes of capital and the degree of impact of symbolic power 
exercitation is why the impact of doxic battles decreases alongside with the decrease in the size of 
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the field. Following this line of thinking, an agent needs to possess a great volume of capital in 
order to challenge the established order of things – the doxa of the state. This has historically been 
prohibited by the state that has been operating with a clear distinction of public and private, which 
means clearly defined boundaries of the state and the private actor. However, with the emergence of 
neoliberalism, private actors are gaining increasingly more terrain and hence they are becoming a 
still stronger challenger of the states’ doxa and thus the state is losing its monopoly over symbolic 
power that is the power to shape doxa, which includes the control over defining legitimate forms of 
capital. If the doxa is changed, the field as a whole is changed, which in this case means that the 
state itself will be changed by this de-monopolization of symbolic power. Holding the capital of 
physical force is a key in maintaining the symbolic power, as long as it is legitimate and thus 
convertible to symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1994:5). This means, that by partly privatizing functions 
of the military, one also de-monopolizes the symbolic power and thus allows challengers of the 
established doxa to gain greater influence on the order of things. 
This analysis is also in line with the argument that there is coherence between weak or fragile states 
and the rise of PMSCs (Singer 2008:20). Herein lies a serious threat to the states monopoly on the 
right to exercise symbolic power. When the state is weak, i.e. holds little amounts of economic and 
symbolic capital, its symbolic power is equally weak and thus it seeks to (re)gain symbolic power 
by hiring PMSCs. This is no solution to that problem, though, because by doing this, the state 
actually loses its monopoly on symbolic power and hence become weaker in regards to symbolic 
power and doxa-making.  
Furthermore, an increasing privatization within weaker states threatens its ability to impose 
symbolic power over its citizens. This is especially prevalent when the legislative branch is weak, 
which is somewhat defining of a weak state, and the executive branch becomes privatized and 
stronger (Sassen 2008:72). When a key part of the executive branch, such as the military, becomes 
privatized it not only has the potential to alter the state’s monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic 
power but also the rights of citizens. A privatization of the executive branch moves authority from 
the public to the private, which threatens the capability of citizens to demand accountability through 
the state’s legislative branch (ibid.). Thus, when a weak legislative branch is outsourcing the 
executive branch, the rights of citizens change as their legislative connection to the executive 
authority erodes.  
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6 Private Corporations Hiring PMSCs 
In the following section, we will examine how privately owned (foreign) oil and gas companies, 
operating in Nigeria utilize PMSCs. Specifically, our case concerns extraction of oil in the Niger 
Delta and the different companies who profit off this extraction. According to Abrahamsen and 
Williams, security ranks as the second largest source of profit in Nigeria after oil and gas 
(Abrahamsen & Williams 2005:3). Additionally, the area is plagued by several high security risks, 
for instance kidnapping, oil theft, sabotage of pipelines, etc. (African Business Magazine 
2012). This makes this case a relevant and favorable example of private companies using PMSCs, 
as there is a high need for security measures to be taken and the private security industry is 
prevalent in the area.  
In this chapter we will first go over the aspects identified in chapter 2 that are relevant for 
understanding civil-military relations when private companies become involved. We will be looking 
at the type of company, the services provided, the type of client they work for, and the context that 
the company operates under. We will then, based on Avant’s framework, try to understand the types 
of control exerted over the companies. Hereafter, we will look at the relationship between the 
PMSCs and authority in order to identify whether there has been a change in the symbolic capital, 
which would signify a change in the doxa within the field of civil-military relations. We will 
examine what forms of capital that are seen as legitimate, who legitimizes them, and why. We do 
this, in order to understand whether there has been a change in the doxa within the field of civil-
military relations, creating a de-monopolization of symbolic power possibly leading to norm 
change. 
 
6.1. Insecurity and Security Provisions 
There are several PMSCs operating in Nigeria, providing security for oil and gas companies, which 
are constantly under threat. The state of Nigeria has been unable to provide sufficient security for 
many of these extraction companies, and one might say that a security void has appeared in specific 
areas, and that the PMSCs have stepped in to fulfill a need, which has traditionally been seen as the 
states area of responsibility. The severity of the high security risk situation, which extraction 
companies operate under in the Niger Delta area, becomes apparent when looking at Shell, who in 
2009 experienced a kidnapping of 62 employees, while three other workers were killed 
(Amunwa 2012). Additionally, this shows that the state of Nigeria cannot provide sufficiently 
secure locations for gas and oil companies, which then creates a need for the companies to hire 
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someone to uphold security. It can be argued that it is in the interest of the Nigerian state to protect 
the foreign gas and oil companies extracting in the country, as the tax these companies pay, as well 
as the profit from derivatives from the oil companies, are some of the state’s major income sources, 
and therefore the state depends on PMSCs coming in and securing its economic interest.  
 
Shell spent at least one billion US dollars on security in 2007 and 2009, and almost 40% of the one 
billion was spent in Nigeria (Amunwa 2012). In 2008 alone, Shell spent more on security in the 
Delta than they did in North and South America, EU and Russia combined (ibid.). Abrahamsen and 
Williams writes that:  
 
“In recent years, these dynamics have been intensified by illegal oil bunkering. This 
has become a huge enterprise, with Shell alone estimating a loss of 2.6 
million barrels a year, the equivalent of $441 million a year in future revenues” 
(Abrahamsen & Williams 2005:12).  
 
This loss might have been the cause behind an increase in Shell’s ‘other’ expenses in 2008, which 
can be seen in the leaked document. These ‘other’ expenses represent expenses which also cover 
PMSCs, which accounts for over 40% of Shell’s global security spending. Figures from 2009 
indicate that Shell spent $75 million on ‘other’ security costs in Nigeria, which is $10 million more 
than it spent on ‘third parties’ that year (government forces in Nigeria and internal police force). 
And generally, figures show that: "Shell’s provision of $35 million for security contractors was a 
substantial 10% of its global security budget in 2008" (Amunwa 2012). 
 
Private security has become a major part of the Nigerian economy, and according to estimates from 
2006, there was between 1,500 and 2,000 PMSCs operating in Nigeria, who in total were 
employing around 100,000 people (Abrahamsen & Williams 2006:3). In 2011 this estimate had 
risen to 2,500 PMSCs operating in Nigeria (Purpura 2011:206). Due to the increased instability in 
the area today, it is plausible to estimate that this number has further increased within the past four 
years. Krahman argues that: “[t]he more widespread the [...] use of armed security contractors, the 
more likely it is that it will be considered normal” (Krahman 2013: 56). This creates a situation 
where the PMSCs might be seen as a normal and integrated part of the country’s daily life, giving 
way for them to interact more easily with citizens.  
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As the oil extraction sites are at the Niger Delta, this is where the PMSCs primarily operate. Apart 
from the security services provided at the Niger Delta, the PMSCs are also hired for logistics and 
training. According to Abrahamsen & Williams, this unarmed part of the private security:  
 
“[…] exercises a fundamental impact on the security situation in the Niger Delta, 
providing technology, expertise, and expatriate personnel that substantially influence 
the practices of public security forces, as well as providing capabilities that would 
otherwise be absent” (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009:12). 
    
This shows that the services provided lie within several types of security services, including 
security and protection at the Delta, supplying new technological resources, personnel, and 
expertise and training for these tasks. Even though we have no means of examining the specific 
contract between Shell and a PMSC, we can conclude that a contract would list these services, for 
the PMSC to supply.  
 
Platform London1 argues that as security contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq became fewer, Western 
PMSCs quickly saw new prosperous opportunities in the oil fields of the Niger Delta (Amunwa 
2012). Control Risks Group, Erinys, G4S, and Saladin Security are among the UK-based security 
companies that have prospered from contracts in the Niger Delta. According to Abrahamsen and 
Williams, G4S’ contract with Chevron Nigeria was one of the most expensive contracts for PMSCs 
in the Nigerian oil industry, and one of the company’s biggest contracts in Africa (Abrahamsen & 
Williams 2009:10). 
According to their websites, these companies all classify themselves as some form of a security 
company. Control Risk Group writes that they are a global risk consultancy, which deals with 
security risks (Control Risk Group n.d.). Erinys are a security company with specialization in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Erinys n.d.). G4S has a specific subsidiary for their operations in Nigeria called  
‘G4S Secure Solutions Nigeria Limited’, and defines themselves as a security solutions company 
(G4S Nigeria n.d. a), while lastly, Saladin Security writes that they are a security and risk 
management company (Saladin Security 2015). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Platform London is a company doing research on especially oil companies. They combine art, activism and research 
(Platform London n.d.). 
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Providing security in Nigeria can be a controversial issue due the fact that the Nigerian law 
only allows for state police and military to carry arms. According to the Private Guard Companies 
Act (1986), 9, PSMCs are prohibited from carrying firearms (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009:10). 
Nevertheless, due to high level of violence and insecurity in the state, many private security 
contractors, need the legal means to provide armed response to be able to provide sufficient 
security, in case of emergency or attack (ibid.).  
According to G4S Nigeria’s website, they have created a partnership with a Nigerian owned 
company, who has special permission from the government to carry guns, and who then provide 
guards for G4S Nigeria, who in turn provides expertise and technology (G4S Nigeria n.d. b). 
 
For some companies, this has been solved through cooperation with the Nigerian Police. Members 
of the police, who are armed with fully automatic weapons, are paired with the PMSCs, and 
integrated into their operations (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009:10). These police officers take 
orders from their own commanders, but get an extra salary, paid by the companies, and are 
therefore also supervised by the PMSC commanders, which leads to a significant blend of 
public/state and private authority and responsibility. Additionally, the troops who are guarding the 
oil facilities get their instructions from the oil companies as well as the PMSCs, while also taking 
orders from their commanders. In regards to this, Ben Amunwa writes: “It is unclear where 
corporate responsibility ends and government control begins" (Amunwa 2012). This can be seen as 
a step towards a change in the monopoly to exercise both violence and, as we turn to later, symbolic 
power. Here an erosion of a private-public division is happening, which alters rights through a shift 
of authority. 
 
Even though the PMSCs provide security services, it is necessary for them to partner up with other 
companies or the government in order to provide this service. This creates close ties between the 
state and the PMSCs and might even make it difficult for a regular citizen to differentiate between 
the two, as the guards at the Niger Delta can be both government and private security guards. This 
configuration of security brings with it a set of new and extended rights, only obtainable to those 
who can afford the protection of a PMSC. This is a development of great threat to those who cannot 
pay the required fees needed to guarantee some degree of protection of rights, whether it regards 
private property rights or something else. The problem arises if this kind of private security 
becomes so widespread that the Nigerian state deprioritizes the provision of security for its citizens 
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when the PMSCs seems to be doing their job well. What happens to the non-paying citizens and 
their rights, if essentially the Nigerian state has economic interest in caring for the oil companies 
who generates revenue for the benefit of the state? Another aspect of this problem arises with 
regards to the protection of Nigerian citizens, if the PMSCs is more or less given carte blanche to 
secure the oil extraction sites and property – who, then, is on the side of the Nigerians who might be 
seen as a threat by these PMSCs hired by Shell and Chevron?        
  
This fusion of public/state actors with the private security actors is necessary for the PMSCs, as it 
is unlikely that the PMSCs hired by the private oil and gas companies for protection, would 
be willing to provide unarmed security services in such a dangerous area as the Niger Delta. Despite 
confusion about corporate and government responsibility, the two parties are dependent on each 
other. Without the police, the PMSCs would not be able to legally provide armed protection for the 
oil companies. Vice versa, without the PMSCs, the state would be unable to provide sufficient 
security to the private oil and gas companies, on which it depends economically. Therefore, the 
state is ‘forced’ to outsource violence to private security contractors. Despite this mutually 
beneficial bond between the state and the PMSCs, it might not benefit the state as a sovereign 
entity, as Abrahamsen and Williams says: "[…] while global security assemblages may enhance the 
state’s economic and security capacities, this does not necessarily mean that they strengthen the 
state in a broader sense." (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009:15).  
 
The privatization of security, especially in relation to civil-military relations, poses problems and 
begs the question: "[…] if security becomes a private service, what happens to the idea that it is a 
public good?" (Abrahamsen & Williams 2005:17). As mentioned above, this is an especially 
relevant question in regards to Nigeria where the police fuses with the PMSCs and are being used to 
provide security for those who can afford to pay for it, which then moves focus away from other 
needs for security in society. This means that the corporate component, in terms of civil-military 
relations, is almost absorbed by the military institutions as they must merge in order to function.  
 
6.2. Types of Control 
When examining civil-military relations, it is relevant to look at the state in question and its ability 
to oversee the companies operating within its borders and ensure that they comply with the rules of 
the given state. Therefore, we examine how the functional, political, and social dimensions of state 
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control over armed forces, to understand how the corporate component works together with the civil 
power and military institutions in the Nigerian state. 
 
As mentioned above, the PMSCs who operate in Nigeria have to cooperate with the government or 
Nigerian companies regulated by the government in order to provide their services. In relation to 
functional control, this means that the government of Nigeria has some functional control over the 
PMSCs as they need licenses and cooperation to operate. According to Berndtsson, some friction 
can arise between government workers and private contractors if there is animosity between the two 
due to jealousy over pay or other (Berndtsson 2012:120). Additionally, as the PMSCs are business 
enterprises, they must compete with each other for contracts, which might create frictions between 
the companies, causing problems of functional control when the companies have to cooperate. 
Nevertheless, the state of Nigeria, at times in collaboration with the gas and oil companies, has the 
means to exert functional control over the PMSCs in Nigeria.  
 
The political dimension of control of PMSCs in Nigeria can be argued to be a weak legislative 
branch. Political control in practice is usually related to activities like screening employees of 
PMSCs and making sure that they live up to the standard of the state. As the clients of the PMSCs 
are private companies, the business contract between the two companies might contain some 
agreement of how each individual security contractor is vetted and selected. However, there is no 
public access to this contract, thus there is no way of knowing what goes into or who is in charge of 
selection and vetting of employees of the PMSCs. It could be assumed that the PMSC itself is in 
charge of this control, which then reduces the state authority over the company. In practice, this can 
cause problems for the state authority as the mechanisms for oversight goes through the companies 
and not the state. However, the Nigerian state forbids PMSCs to carry arms, leading them to work 
closely together with state police or military. This is the only kind of security measure the Nigerian 
state takes to keep control over the PMSCs, which it does in order to being able to exert political 
control within its territory. However, Nigeria is a weak state and its law officers are more 
susceptible to bribery, which creates a risk of undermining this security measure.   
 
Lastly, the social dimension of control of force pertains to the social values of the state. In terms of 
the Nigeria case, this might apply to both the Nigerian state but also the client who hires the PMSC 
as they are interested in upholding an image as a company that follows the social values of either 
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their own country or international community. Of course, just because the security personnel comes 
from a private company does not mean that they will not adhere to social values and norms. As 
Berndtsson writes: “[…] adherence to international values – even among highly trained 
professionals from Western militaries – cannot be taken for granted” (Berndtsson 2012:121). There 
is some incentive for security contractors to adhere to the social norms and values of the country 
they operate in, as a good relationship with local government could help their operations, and good 
relations with the locals might ease some unrest. In Nigeria, the PMSCs often work closely together 
with state police, or nationally owned companies, who can assist with conforming to the social 
values of the state. Additionally, companies like Chevron and Shell, though multinational, are both 
headquartered in and originate from western countries. On those grounds, it could be argued that the 
companies would want to adhere to the social values of western companies and/or countries.  
 
6.3. Change and Continuity  
In the following section, we will examine the potential change in symbolic capital in the 
relationship between PMSCs and authority. We look at the legitimate forms of capital, and where 
this legitimacy comes from. We seek to understand whether there has been a change in the balance 
of the monopoly on violence and economics within the Nigerian state, which then has created a de-
monopolization of symbolic power.  
 
One can argue that a type of doxic battle is taking place between the state, and the challenger to the 
doxa of the state, being PMSCs on the other side. The state stands for the established orthodoxy. 
The PMSCs stand for the heterodoxy – the challenger of the doxa, who ‘fights’ for access to the 
state’s violence and authority. As in any doxic struggle, what is at stake is ultimately the right to 
exercise symbolic power (see 3.2.3). The doxic battle that take place between the Nigerian state and 
the private agents, however, is not a struggle over the absolute monopoly on symbolic power, rather 
it is a struggle over de-monopolization hereof.  
The state still holds the symbolic power as it is the state that legitimizes all forms of capital. It is in 
the state’s interest to maintain this symbolic power, as this is ultimately what makes possible the 
structuring of the state and thus, without symbolic power, there would be no state. However, by 
focusing solely on economic capital, as the Nigerian state seems to do, other forms of capital, be it 
social or cultural, become secondary forms of capital, even though they often will influence the 
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agents capacity to accumulate economical capital. When the Nigerian state, as is evident in this 
case, legitimizes Shell and Chevron because they possess, accumulate, and generate great volumes 
of economic capital, it is in fact submitting to a (global) capitalist doxa that legitimizes economic 
capital above all other forms of capital. When legitimized, it is convertible into symbolic capital, 
and possession of symbolic capital is what leads to symbolic power. Shell, Chevron, and the 
PMSCs they hire are challenging the Nigerian state’s doxa by advocating that profit is everyone’s 
interest. It is also challenging the part of the doxa that legitimizes ‘the capital of physical force’ 
(Bourdieu 1994:5), as this has previously been under monopoly by state agents, but now it is 
possible for private agents to gain symbolic capital through the capital of physical force. The private 
agents in this case all participate in a doxic battle, in which they try to challenge the orthodoxy by 
claiming that their specific forms of capital i.e. economic and physical force are legitimate. When 
these are recognized by the state as being legitimate, it gives the private agents symbolic power, and 
has already changed doxa.    
However, it is not simply one authority challenging another, but rather the state that chooses, in the 
lack of better options, to outsource its power to PMSCs, which serves its own interest in terms of 
the income revenue and internal order that the state has been unable to uphold on its own. However, 
seeing this from the perspective of the framework we have developed, gaining economic capital is 
not sufficient for maintaining a monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic power. In the case of 
Nigeria, the state might gain economic capital by allowing PMSCs to operate within its territory, 
but this means that there is a ‘capital-tradeoff’ where PMSCs essentially gain influence on the state 
doxa by selling their services. Services that, when bought by Shell and Chevron, makes the PMSCs 
legitimate holders of the capital of physical force, though it is crucial remember that this 
legitimization is made by the Nigerian state. Therefore, one cannot argue that the Nigerian state is 
fighting for orthodoxy, rather it compromises its symbolic power because it seems like the only 
option in order to maintain some degree of political and economic stability, which is needed in 
order to obtain economic capital and ultimately to uphold the state as such. One can say, though, 
that both the oil companies and the PMSCs they hire are challengers of the doxa and are in fact 
gaining influence hereon because of the Nigerian state’s emphasize on economic capital, which is 
regarded as more important than maintaining a monopoly on symbolic power.  
The oil companies buy the services from the PMSCs in order to secure a stable environment in 
which they can gain economic capital by extracting oil. The Nigerian state makes money from this 
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too, which is why it allows this to happen. In other words, the state allows and legitimates the use of 
PMSCs because it also seeks the economic capital obtainable through Shell’s and Chevron’s work.  
The consequence of this is ultimately that the PMSCs have brought with them a slippery slope of 
de-monopolization of symbolic power, which is the doxa-making power. This is a development 
towards an oligarchy or plutocracy, which is changing the civil-military relations and becomes 
problematic at two crucial points: First, this power struggle within Nigeria creates a relation 
between holders of economical capital and security. It simply makes coherence between being 
resourceful and being able to provide oneself with security (see also Wagner 2001: 9951-9952). 
Second, a ripple effect could evolve as the PMSCs might hold the potential for essentially making 
the state security branches obsolete. This raises the question of whether PMSCs at some point will 
supersede the national armed forces, which then is a serious disruption for the civil-military 
relations and thus the relationship between territory, authority and rights.  
When we remember that doxa is ‘the rules of the game’, what distinguishes the legitimate from the 
illegitimate, the just from the unjust, and ultimately the rich from the poor, and that symbolic power 
is the power to shape doxa (see 3.2.3), symbolic power is also political power. Therefore, the 
outsourcing of symbolic power means a reconfiguration of the state and a complication of the civil-
military relations.   
One can argue that the state of Nigeria’s sovereignty has not been changed when it comes to 
outsourcing hard violence, meaning allowing PMSCs to carry and use firearms, which is still only 
legally permitted for state soldiers and police. However, there are certain loopholes in this law, 
which enables PMSCs to carry arms if they ‘officially’ are under the command of Nigerian state 
officers. However, it is still possible to argue that the states soft violence has been challenged and 
changed by the neoliberal world regime with regards to down-sizing and privatization of public 
goods, which PMSCs are a direct product of. Therefore, the Nigerian state no longer has monopoly 
on violence in every sense. In the perspective of our framework, this does in fact weaken the 
(already weak) state, because the state needs more than economic capital in order to be strong. 
Without the monopoly on the right to exercise symbolic power, the state ‘has sold out’ and has 
opened up for obtaining symbolic power through the possession of economic capital. 
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6.4. Sub-conclusion 
 
Throughout this chapter we have seen that the Nigerian state, by allowing private companies to provide 
security for themselves with help from PMSCs, has set in motion a series of implications for the civil-
military relations. By outsourcing its monopoly on violence, the state has cornered itself because it has 
settled with a profit-oriented approach to decision-making concerning security politics. This leads to 
complications in the civil-military relations because the rupture of the state’s monopoly on violence and 
symbolic power has created a link between holders of economic capital and security measures, and more 
specifically between holders of economic capital and rights. This creates a reshaping of the relationship 
between territory, authority, and rights because the legitimization of a new and private agent as an authority, 
who has the right to exercise violence, is working for a private company that seeks only its own interest. By 
legitimizing the PMSCs, it can be argued that the Nigerian state neglects its responsibility to protect its own 
citizens by securing their rights, because this is the most profitable in terms of economic capital. Ultimately, 
this means that the Nigerian state is selling out on its monopoly on violence, which is more pivotal than it 
seems at first glance, when viewed through the lens of our framework. This is so because the state’s 
legitimization of the PMSCs means that the companies can in fact buy influence in political matters. 
Traditionally within the Westphalian system, the state has been the sovereign within its territory, 
but the introduction of private agents into the security field has changed this. The PMSCs has 
broken the monopoly on violence and with it also the states monopoly on the right to exercise 
symbolic power. Since Nigeria is a weak state, its symbolic power is not as powerful as that of a 
strong state, but nonetheless by legitimizing PMSCs it has compromised its symbolic power. The 
reason for this has to do with the doxic submission to the global capitalist doxa that values 
economic capital above anything else. This option seems like the only option when the state’s 
interest is in creating a stable environment for the oil companies, whose operations are generating 
economic growth within the state. However, because of the state’s submission to a capitalist doxa, 
advocated for by the oil companies and PMSCs, the private agents have succeeded in making their 
specific forms of capital legitimate. In this way the private agents have influenced and shaped the 
doxa of the Nigerian state, which can only be done through the possession of symbolic capital 
(legitimized economic capital and capital of physical force in this example). And with symbolic 
capital follows symbolic power – that is the power to shape doxa and thus to define the great order 
of things. Overall, because the Nigerian state is weak, it has started a de-monopolization of 
symbolic power, which is a slippery slope and ultimately raises questions of who is in charge of the 
country’s political affairs.  
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7 States Hiring PMSCs for Armed Conflict 
In the following chapter, we will examine how the United States have utilized PMSCs in their war 
in Iraq. We will start out by outlining the context of the case, looking at the type of companies, 
services, and the situation that the PMSCs operate within. Additionally, we will examine the three 
dimensions of control, to understand how the US is keeping oversight over the private contractors. 
Then we look at the relationship between the PMSCs and the US in terms of authority, where we 
will identify if a change in the doxa and field has occurred. Once again we look at the forms of 
legitimate capital, who legitimizes them, and lastly if this has changed. All this is needed to get us 
closer to an understanding of a possible de-monopolization of symbolic power and norm change.  
7.1. Security Provisions in an Armed Conflict 
 
The history of Iraq has been full of turmoil and war. Several times, Iraq has found itself subject to sanctions, 
embargos and inspections (BBC 02.04.2015). This all culminated in 2003, when the US decided to invade 
the country, based in suspicions of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), which also put an end to the 
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein (BBC 02.04.2015). Since 2003, the United States and its allies have lead a 
war in Iraq, fighting first Saddam Hussein and his supporters, then an insurgency, and recently Islamic State, 
meanwhile trying to establish a democratic government in the country. Since the very beginning of the war, 
PMSCs have been present, working for both state and non-state clients, and providing a variety of services 
(Berndtsson 2012:115). Estimates say that in 2006 there were around 50,000-100,000 private contractors 
operating in Iraq, of which half were delivering armed tactical services (Berndtsson 2012:115;Merle 
05.12.2006). The use of PMSCs in Iraq has also been widely debated, due to both the large number of private 
contractors, and the worth of their contracts, and due to the number of violent episodes, most prominently 
with the Nisour Square massacre in 2007, where 4 private contractors from Blackwater shot 17 Iraqis 
(Berndtsson 2012:116).  
The PMSCs operating in Iraq obviously work in a very high-risk environment, as the country has 
been a conflict-zone since the invasion in 2003. As Berndtsson writes, if the insurgents in Iraq view 
the PMSCs as being part of the coalition, they are then part of the ‘threat’, which creates a highly 
insecure situation for the PMSCs (Berndtsson 2012:122). According to the website iCasualties, an 
independent website which tracks the deaths of military in Iraq by compiling information from 
Multi-National Force and the US Department of Defence, among others, 468 private contractors 
have been killed in the Iraq war, compared to 4491 American soldiers (iCasualties n.d. a; 
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iCasualties n.d. b). This shows that PMSCs still do not experience as big of a risk as the public 
army, though they still endure the risk of attacks and ultimately fatalities.  
There are several PMSCs operating in Iraq, and as mentioned some work for state and others for 
non-state actors. There are several constellations of states hiring PMSCs, both the US themselves, 
the Iraqi state and multinational forces like the Joint Contracting Command, as well as private 
companies hiring other PMSCs with funding from the US (Krahman 2013:62;Berndtsson 
2012:116). For example, the US State Department has contracts with the companies Triple Canopy 
and DynCorp International to provide protective services (Berndtsson 2012:116). DynCorp 
International refer to themselves as a ‘services company’, listing among their services: aviation, 
intelligence and security, ITS training, logistics and contingency operations, operations and 
maintenance, and training (DynCorp International 2015). 
As another example of one of these constellations, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, 
which is a US Army program that employs corporations to provide logistics support for the army, 
had a subcontract with the company Regency Hotel and Hospitality, who in turn hired Blackwater 
for security services (Berndtsson 2012:116;COGR 12.03.2004). Though this contract is not directly 
between the American state and the PMSC, Blackwater still worked under the oversight of the US, 
as their contract with Regency Hotel and Hospitality in effect was under the US Army.  
Other companies operating in Iraq have been hired through the Joint Contracting Command in 
Baghdad (Krahman 2013:62). Several other PMSCs have operated in Iraq, in some way or other 
hired by the American state, but as mentioned, the list is extensive, and several smaller companies 
will not be mentioned in this analysis. 
Like the list of companies, the range of services provided in Iraq by private contractors has been 
comprehensive. According to Berndtsson, these services included armed tactical services, like 
guarding individuals or convoys, as well as:  
“[…] logistics, maintenance of weapons systems, military/police training, security-
sector reform (SSR), risk assessment, intelligence services, interrogators/translators, 
static guards and bodyguards, as well as armed convoy escorts or close protection 
teams” (Berndtsson 2012:116).  
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Merle writes that DynCorp International provided around 700 contractors to train the Iraqi police 
force, while L-3 Communications’ companies worked with strategic planning, budgeting, 
establishing a public affairs office, and providing linguists for various tasks (Merle 05.12.2006). 
Leander writes specifically that some of the private contractors worked with maintenance and 
loading of bombers and helicopters, as well as operating the US Army’s missile batteries and 
missile defense system (Leander 2005:810).  
The introduction of PMSCs into the Iraqi conflict traces back to political decisions made post-
invasion. P.W. Singer argues that the planning and everything that went before the invasion and war 
itself, was riddled with mistakes and bad political decisions (Singer, 2008:243f). Arguments made 
on the insufficiency in the planning of the invasion, and particular what should be done afterwards, 
was publicly disregarded as unsubstantiated critique (ibid.). However, pride come before a fall, and 
the 135,000 troops originally planned, proved too few (ibid:244). The obvious option to send in 
more troops, though, would have imposed a loss of face for the Bush administration, as it would 
both acknowledge the bad planning of the already unpopular war and put more troops at risk. 
Though, PMSCs seemed a viable solution to the overly burdened troops in Iraq. Not only did hiring 
PMSCs improve on the functionality of the forces in Iraq but also alleviate the public pressure on 
the President and his administration. In civil-military relation terms, this means a strengthening of 
the functional imperative but without compromising the societal imperative, and such, try to 
accomplish the mission in a manner that will not further infuriate the public. 
7.2. Types of Control 
 
To understand how the US has kept oversight with the many PMSCs working for and with them in Iraq, we 
look at the three dimensions of control: functional, political and social.  
As mentioned in the section above, though many of the companies work for the US in some form, 
most of them are not directly controlled by the US Army, especially as several of the private 
contractors work for other companies working for the US. This has meant some friction on the 
functional level, as there is a huge lack of information and communications between the private 
contractors and the public army (Berndtsson 2012:118). Specifically, this has lead to so-called blue 
on white incidents, where the military and private contractors fire at each other. At one point, “[…] 
twenty such instances of blue and white violence […]” occurred in a five-month period (ibid.:119). 
Though several different initiatives have been taken to improve military-PMSC cooperation, the 
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problems continue due to both differences in organization and negative perceptions of the PMSCs 
(ibid.:120). This low quality in PMSC-military relations affects the functional control insofar that 
the state’s control over PMSCs is severely decreased in comparison to their control over the public 
military (ibid.).  
Looking at the political control, this reduced direct state control over organization and deployment 
of forces that the privatization leads to, causes several problems with respect to political control of 
force. The American state has attempted to keep some oversight over the contracting in Iraq, with 
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, created in 2004, which has inspected 
hundreds of issues with private contractors in Iraq (Perry 2012:46). Despite having this 
congressional oversight, in 2007 no US government agency was keeping any record of the number 
of PMSCs active in Iraq (Debusmann 03.07.2007). Additionally, functions of political control, like 
screening and selecting personnel and enforcing rules and policies, in addition to the oversight of 
these functions, have all been carried out by the PMSCs themselves (Berndtsson 2012:122). 
Another tool of the political control over force is the Rules of Engagement (ROE). These rules 
“[…] restrict military autonomy, proscribe certain behaviour and require that the military report up 
the chain of command and inform civilian principals about operations thus indicating when rules 
need to be changed” (ibid.:123f). ROE functions as a sort of leash on the military and on the 
PMSCs. But with frequent problems of information, especially in the feedback mechanisms as 
many violent incidents go unreported, ROE cannot perform its function, and thus will not work as 
an instrument of political control (ibid.:124). 
Finally, in terms of social control over PMSCs in Iraq, some have argued that because many 
PMSCs hire personnel who have background in elite forces of Western militaries, it can be assumed 
that these will bring with them the adherence to social values that has been expected of them before 
(ibid.:121). However, even among highly trained Western military, the adherence of international 
values cannot always be expected, which has been argued to be the case in Iraq (ibid.). According to 
an interview with a PMSC employee, private contractors in Iraq ranges from “[…] people with 
incredibly solid military education to fortune-seekers and mythomaniacs” (ibid.). This can create 
situations where private contractors acts in a way that does not observe social values, which could 
be due to a lack of oversight. However, Avant argues that this could also be due to the US 
intentionally employing companies that are willing to take on tasks of a more hazardous nature 
(Avant 2005:227). She argues that some US officials have admitted that they seek PMSCs that 
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“[…] act like soldiers not businessmen” (Avant 2005:228). In effect, there might have been a trade-
off between functional and social control, so that the functional level works, but compromising 
social values.  
7.3. Change and Continuity 
 
In this section we will follow our framework, and look at the legitimate forms of capital in this case, 
as well as where this legitimacy comes from. Similarly to the previous case-analysis of the private 
level, we seek to understand whether there has been a change in the doxa of the security field on a 
state level. This is held up against the civil-military relations, and the change herein, described above. In 
this way, we examine how the case of the US’ use of PMSCs in Iraq relates to the civil-military relations and 
whether this shows a change in authority.  
One can argue that there are two types of doxic battles going on in this case. On one side is the doxa 
shaped by the Iraqi political system, which is challenged by the heterodoxy political US agenda, in 
terms of implementation of democracy. However, this doxic battle is not the main interest of this 
case-analysis, but nevertheless important to keep in mind, because it places the US in a dual 
position. This is due to the other doxic battle, and the one that this project focuses on, which is the 
doxic battle between the US and the US-hired PMSCs operating in Iraq. Here, the US stands for the 
established orthodoxy, with focus on its rightful use of force, with the PMSCs representing the 
heterodoxy, the challenger to this position. The point of interest in this doxic battle is how the US’ 
use of PMSCs, instead of solely relying of US military in Iraq, affects the US’s monopoly on 
violence and what that means to their monopoly on symbolic power.  
One could argue that the US maintains the symbolic power as it is the state that legitimizes all 
forms of capital. It is in the US’ interest to maintain its established doxa, in terms of its monopoly 
on violence (symbolic power), as this is ultimately what makes the structuring of the state possible, 
meaning that without symbolic power, there would be no state.   
This is also one of the reasons why outsourcing violence to PMSCs, from this point of departure, 
can potentially, be seen as the beginning of the demise of the nation-state (as in the case of Nigeria). 
This is so because the US gives up its symbolic capital to the private sector, who, if not controlled 
properly, has the potential to overtake the state as a new type of private ruler replacing a sovereign 
(or with sovereignty depending solely on the accumulation of economic capital, which makes it 
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dynamic). However, as we shall see, this does in fact not seem to be happening, as both sides of 
agents (the US and the PMSCs) exist and thrive in a symbiotic relationship.    
 
When looking at the US as an agent in the field of international politics, it is clear that the US holds 
a dominant position because of its total volumes of accumulated forms of legitimate capital. The 
US, in fact, holds a monopoly-like symbolic power that allows it to legitimate said forms of capital, 
and because of the strength of the US as an agent, its doxa-making capacities stretch far beyond its 
home territory and reach out across the entire globe. In other words, the US holds a global 
monopoly on symbolic power, and has a powerfully manifested doxa that resides in a capitalist and 
neoliberal dogmatic vision. One can say that this doxa has evolved over time, through the doxic 
battles that have taken place throughout the nation’s entire history. The minimal-state, advocated 
for by politicians and notable parts of civil-society, has a build-in conviction towards privatization, 
which make the use of PMSCs not as doxic-changing as in other states. However, it is new (in 
recent history) that the privatization of physical force takes place and this reflects a doxic battle of 
compromise. It is a battle of compromise or balance, because the state cannot fully outsources its 
monopoly on symbolic power and the corporate agents cannot dissolve the state entirely (assuming 
that there is no state without a state military), because they live off of each other. The way that the 
US needs the PMSCs in relation to civil-military relations is, as pointed in the beginning of this 
chapter, to get the job done faster and without sending more national troops to Iraq in order to do 
so, because the conflict had caused public distrust against the administration. The PMSCs need the 
state because they hold the symbolic power, so the PMSCs are only relevant because they are 
legitimized by the state. However, because the capital of physical force is such a crucial part of 
maintaining a monopoly on symbolic power, there is a limit as to how much violence can be 
outsourced. It seems that the US is aware of this, but because the US is such a powerful player, i.e. 
has a vast volume of accumulated forms of capital, they can still afford to outsource great deals of 
the capital of physical force (that is to legitimize PMSCs use hereof).  
 
This is so, once again, because the US ultimately is the player who has the symbolic power on a 
global scale, that is they define the orthodoxy (which is a neoliberal doxa). This means that the US 
in general terms defines what forms of capital are legitimate and convertible into symbolic capital, 
and when it legitimizes PMSCs use of violence, it gives them symbolic power. There is a natural 
limit as to how far the US can go with this outsourcing of violence, and it seems as it is in the 
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interest of both PMSCs and the US to maintain a balance in the degree of outsourcing of violence 
because of the interdependent relationship that is between these two (types of) agents.   
7.4. Sub-conclusion 
 
As the case of Iraq shows, the US has seen a prosperous scene in Iraq for using PMSCs, with the number of 
private contractors in Iraq topping at around 100,000. Politically, the use of PMSCs has removed some 
pressure on the US state, as the political implications of casualties, inter alia, are not as dire as with the state 
military. In some regard, the functional imperative has gained something by hiring PMSCs, as the state 
military did not seem fit to take on the task alone. But in other regards, problems with functional control of 
the PMSCs have meant that the state does not always have complete control over the PMSCs, though Avant 
argues that this might have been by design. The state has had some form of functioning political control over 
the PMSCs, and though they have strived to exert social control, this might have been compromised in some 
instances, for a functional imperative.  
In terms of a neoliberal agenda, it makes sense for the US to ‘practice what they preach’ which 
makes it very natural and in accordance with the US neoliberal doxa, to take this step towards a 
partly privatization of the military. It is somewhat unclear, however, what the role of the PMSCs 
has actually played in doxa-changing, namely because there is this consistency between the grand 
political ideas (of privatization) and the praxis of the US. However, as stated before, the outsourcing 
of violence is fairly new (at least in the time of neoliberalism) and therefore, this can be credited to 
the PMSCs who have been able to convince the US of their eligibility, which is what has led to their 
legitimization and hence putting their stamp on the US doxa. This should be seen as a modification 
of a latent US neoliberal orthodoxy rather than as a heterodoxy victory. In short: the doxic battle 
that takes place between the US state and the PMSCs is not antagonistic in nature, rather it is 
‘battle’ over balancing a mutually desired optimal degree of privatization. This is optimal balance is 
a requirement for the US (and the PMSCs) who, like every agent in any field, is interested in 
maintaining its dominant position and its monopoly on symbolic power, which at this level is the 
power over (cultural) hegemony.  
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8 International Organizations Hiring PMSCs 
In this chapter, we zoom in on East Timor, a country that for years has gone through a humanitarian 
crisis. We specifically look into the types of private military and security companies and the tasks 
they have been assigned by the United Nations, and more generally we look into the role these 
PMSCs have had in carrying out the transition from a non-self-governing territory to becoming an 
independent state. Through examples of PMSCs operating under UN mandate in East Timor, we 
will investigate what the possible impact of this has been, in relation to civil-military relations.    
 
East Timor was colonized by Portugal for more than 400 years (Stephens 2005:6). In 1975, 
however, a shift occurred so it was now under the control of Indonesia, who invaded the country. 
Since then, there have been ongoing accusations of violations of human rights, caused by 
Indonesian forces, and East Timor has been regarded by the General Assembly of the UN, as a 
territory that was not self-governing. Therefore, in 1999, the UN assisted East Timor in conducting 
a ballot so that the people of East Timor could “exercise their right to self-determination” (Stephens 
2005:6). The result was overwhelming: with a turnout of almost 99 % of eligible voters, 78.5 % was 
in favor of a ‘no’ to upholding the country’s administrative ties to Indonesia (ibid.:13). For more 
than two years from this time, East Timor was plagued by violence and political turmoil, until 
finally achieving independency as a sovereign nation in May 2002 (Stephens 2005:5). Before the 
independency, the UN established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) (UN 2006). UNTAET was solely in charge of the political administration of the country 
from 1999-2002. This included the mandate  
 
”[…] to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East 
Timor; to establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil 
and social services; to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, rehabilitation of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development 
assistance; to support capacity-building for self-government; and to assist in the 
establishment of conditions for sustainable development” (ibid.).  
 
After the establishment of an East Timorese parliament in 2002, a new UN operation was mandated 
which was known as the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). UNMISET 
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was launched to help East Timor in the time of its post-independence. UNMISET was being carried 
out with the mandate  
 
“to provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and 
political stability of East Timor; to provide interim law enforcement and public 
Security and to assist in developing the East Timor Police Service (ETPS); and 
contribute to the maintenance of the new country's external and internal security” 
(ibid.).  
 
During the time of UNTAET and UNMISET, a number of UN peacekeeping missions were being 
carried out in East Timor (Stephens 2005:14). There is very limited transparency when it comes to 
these tasks performed by private contractors. However, there are plenty of examples of PMSCs 
mandated by the UN to operate in peace operations in East Timor.  
 
The private company Performance Agility Experience (PAE) was assigned to help the UN with 
operating airfields in East Timor (PAE n.d.:5). PAE describes itself as a provider of mission 
services. This includes aviation, logistics, training, and national security solutions, among others 
(PAE 2015). Other examples of UN’s use of PMSCs in peace operations in East Timor include a 
contract made with DynCorp to supply helicopter transport and satellite network communications 
(Østensen 2011:16). Defence Systems Limited (DSL) provided the UN with intelligence and 
logistical support (Østensen 2011:16;Bellamy & Williams 2004:191). DSL changed name to 
ArmorGroup in 1997, before being bought up by G4S in 2008. G4S describes ArmorGroup as a 
provider of defensive and protective security services (G4S 07.05.2008). Furthermore, the UN has 
used forces from different South African companies, like KZN Security, who was contracted to 
provide the UN with local intelligence (Singer 2003:183). KZN Security describes themselves as a 
provider of security services (KZN Security 2011). 
 
In comparison with the other cases, the case of East Timor is a completely different issue as the 
civil-military relations are much more complex. This is because in this case the UN functions as the 
authority in the place of a sovereign state. The internal security is controlled by the UN which 
means that the UN’s use of PMSCs cannot be said to threaten a sovereign state or even political 
stability, as there has been no such things in the wake of this conflict. However, the UN control of 
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the territory does not mean that there are no threats in regards to violating right. As pointed out by 
Richemond, there has been examples of UN staff not respecting human rights and there has even 
been incidents where UN staff has been involved in sexual violations and murder (Richemond 
2007:11). This is a clear example of lack of supervision and control over its forces from the UN. 
 
However, these incidents do not evidently relate to the PMSCs that has been contracted to support 
the UN, but they have played a part in helping to do the job. Generally, we have witnessed a change 
in the nature of the UN peacekeeping operations. A change towards so-called ‘robust’ peacekeeping 
operations has occurred, especially since the case of East Timor (Pingeot 2012:37). The UN has 
gone from peacekeeping operations which rested on principles of impartiality, consent, and 
exclusion of the use of force for anything else than self-defense to a more war-fighting approach. 
This shift was possible because the Security Council broadened the circumstances under which the 
UN forces were allowed to use force. In East Timor, the UN forces were mandated to use force 
“[…] for the “protection of civilians” and the maintenance of public order” (ibid.).  
 
8.1. Civil-Military Relations and the UN 
In regards to civil-military relations, the United Nations is a rather special case. The way that the 
UN is constituted allows for a constructing of a supra-national civil power composed of numerous 
national civil powers, taking into account the vast differences that exist between the multiple 
societies. This means that the civil-military relation, in the auspices of the UN, is somewhat 
arbitrary in the sense that it is consisting of a variety of versions. Additionally, the UN military 
forces are generally composed of troops from different nations, compiled under the UN to 
undertake a certain mission. This makes the military part, in the civil-military sense, unique to the 
mission it is supposed to complete, creating a ‘new military’ for each specific mission. The civil 
part, however, is more static. Even though it is quite debatable whether or not the UN actually 
constitutes a supra-national civil power, the way that the UN is constructed, one could argue, is 
enough to regard it as a civil society in regards to civil-military relation theory. If we take into 
account the two forces constructing the military, as presented by Samuel Huntington (1957), the 
functional imperative and the societal imperative, a civil power is evident within the UN - albeit 
perhaps a simple version. The constitution of the UN Charter, together with the titanic amount of 
UN treaties, documents, agreements, and resolutions, is what constitutes the civil in the auspices of 
the UN. All the obligations, normative rights, and guidelines that are required for a membership of 
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the UN make out the social norms that are the societal imperative in civil-military relations. The 
functional imperative, on the other hand, is the military missions that are meant to uphold and 
enforce the societal norms of the UN. Each mission is uniquely structured according to the purpose 
of the mission which leads to the creation of unique institutions to each mission. The civil-military 
relation in the auspices of the UN, then, becomes a relation between the mission-specific 
institutions and the societal imperative in the UN.  
8.2. Types of Control 
 
When returning to the three dimensions of control, functional, political, and social, we can see yet another set 
of differences compared to the two other cases in how these terms can be applied to the case. The unique 
way that the UN is put together and how it sets out to accomplish its missions makes for different approaches 
to the three types of control. As discussed in the section above, the civil-military relation in the UN is quite 
different from the other cases, as it is no one state that controls the military or makes out the civil part. It is, 
then, the unique configuration of each mission that defines the three dimensions of control. 
In this case, the mission is one of state-building, making it difficult to relate any of the types of 
control to the state in question. Since East Timor did not achieve independence until 2002, and the 
following years were a time of state-building, there was no real government to reflect the types of 
control on. However, this case pertains to the UN and PMSCs role in carrying out UN missions. As 
such, when looking at the three types of control we need to look internally in the UN to see how 
these concepts pertain to the case. Even still, the functional control takes a different role than the 
one explained in chapter 2, as it cannot be said that the function of the UN forces in East Timor was 
to defend the country’s interests through force. Rather, the military function was a question of 
keeping the peace. Thus, the functional control in this case pertains to the control over the PMSCs 
in accordance to the objective of the mission, and is a question of the UN controlling the PMSCs 
that they themselves have hired. As such, the UN has legal control over the hired PMSCs in form of 
their contract. Even though we have had no opportunity to review the actual contracts between the 
UN and the PMSCs, one could think that it would be possible for the UN to terminate the contracts 
if the PMSCs violate any of the UN regulations or international law. Though, as mentioned earlier 
in the case, there had been some cases of crimes committed by UN personnel in East Timor, which 
could lead to question the quality of the control that the UN impose on its personnel. But to extend 
that skepticism to PMSCs is a bit unwarranted, and the legal bindings in a business contract may 
even incite a more thorough control.  
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The political control, in this case, concerns the legislative decisions regarding the mission in East 
Timor. As previously mentioned, the UN shifted towards what is referred to as a robust 
peacekeeping operation which meant a shift in the rules regarding the use of force. In East Timor, 
this meant that a mandate to use force, in order to protect civilians and to upkeep the public order, 
was enacted. However, the examples of the use of PMSCs in the East Timor operation only apply to 
non-combat aspects of the operation, making the use of force rather irrelevant for the involved 
PMSCs. However, the East Timor operation was from 1999 to 2002 a matter of peacekeeping as 
well as acting as a temporary government, and shifted to state-building operation after 2002, which 
means that the PMSCs played an active role in the forming of the nation of East Timor. Hence, the 
PMSCs had to work under the normative ideals of the UN, found in their Charter, resolutions, and 
so on. The political control, thus, pertains to the mission’s objective to create a stable political 
environment in order to build a nation.  
The wish to create a stable and democratic nation in East Timor relates back to the societal 
imperative of the UN, which is also the foundation of the social control imposed on the parties 
involved in the operation. The social values and norms within the East Timor operation is easy to 
spot: they build on democracy and notions of human rights. Any company or other form of actor 
involved in the operation is, thus, being imposed by these values and norms in regards to how they 
perform their tasks. Again, the tasks carried out by PMSCs in the East Timor operation can be 
regarded as supportive tasks in the building of the state, and therefore, the contact with the local 
populous is rather limited. The social norms and values thus becomes of less importance for the 
involved PMSCs when performing their given tasks.  
8.3. Change and Continuity  
 
We now turn to the Bourdieu-inspired field analysis. Here we want to examine a possible changing doxa  
Because the UN is a rather powerful authority, in regards to the functional and societal imperative 
of their military, it does not have to outsource violence. Because of UNs relative power, manifested 
through different forms of capital, it is a very powerful agent in the international security field. 
Because the UN is a supra-national authority, it does not make sense to talk of a state doxa. Rather 
we here speak of a supra-national doxa of the international security field. In this field, the UN is, as 
pointed out, a powerful player. It is so because its total volumes of legitimate forms of capital i.e. 
symbolic capital, surpasses most nation states (of which it is composed) and even other supra-
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national bodies. This means, as shown in chapter 4.2., that the UN has great impact on the grand 
doxa – the doxa of the (Western) world and thereby it has great power to affect the doxa of 
subordinate fields. This means that the UN, in the field of international security, stand for a strong 
orthodoxic praxis in terms of peacekeeping and nation-building, and therefore the PMSCs are very 
weak in comparison, when it comes to total volumes of legitimate capital. The PMSCs are thus a 
small threat to the UNs monopoly on symbolic power.  
The PMSCs do however challenge the UN’s orthodoxy by simply advocating for the eligibility of 
their services. The UN has contracted these PMSCs and thus legitimized them, which gives them 
symbolic capital that inevitable gives them a taste of symbolic power. However, the part of the doxa 
that concerns the legitimacy of the capital of physical force is not being challenged by the PMSCs 
used in East Timor. This is crucial because the kind of power relinquished to the private agents is 
very limited as a result of this.  
In the field of international security, the capital of physical force is valorized above most other 
forms of capital (although economic capital is always highly valorized), which means that by only 
outsourcing ‘non-physical force-demanding’ tasks, the UN more or less maintains its monopoly on 
symbolic power. However, there is slightly more to it. For example, the companies DSL and KZN 
Security has both been contracted by the UN to supply local intelligence, which means that they 
have the power of production of knowledge that affects the ways in which the UN staff interacts 
with the locals in accordance with local norms, culture, etc. In other words, the UN has legitimized 
these companies cultural capital. By doing this, these companies gain symbolic power because they 
gain the power over ‘the principles of vision and division’ (Bourdieu 1994:13), which is symbolic 
power in the sense that the PMSCs in charge of this intelligence can in theory define what is right 
and wrong, or even what is a target and what is not.  
When assuming that the UN has made use of the provided intelligence, they legitimize the 
companies’ cultural capital, as said before, and this gives them symbolic power, which is also the 
power to affect doxa. It affects the UN orthodoxy in the way that the UN previously only 
legitimized its own knowledge production, but now it has changed to accept intelligence reports 
from external sources.  
The same is the case when PAE and DynCorp are providing the UN with logistical support such as 
helicopter transportation to the UN troops. The PMSCs economic (material resources) and cultural 
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capital (knowledge on operation of aircrafts etc.) is legitimized by the UN, legitimizing the role that 
these companies play in the state-building. 
Because of the indirect nature of the PMSCs influence on the UNs praxis (the UN has to act and 
have the agency to do so freely – they are not bound to act according to the PMSC-provided 
intelligence) the symbolic power given to the PMSCs is not threatening the UNs authority.   
8.4. Sub-conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have examined the UN’s use of PMSCs in East Timor. East Timor is a special case, as the 
country did not have a (sovereign) state, and the UN then stepped in as a supra-national entity, to establish a 
state. Therefore, the UN served as a substitute-sovereign in this period of instability. This also means that the 
UN holds symbolic power, and some sort of monopoly on violence in the area.  
As mentioned in the chapter, the civil-military relations functions different in this case, compared to 
the other cases, insofar that the civil power in this case is constituted of the UN Charter, and the 
different agreements that the UN has entered into. From these comes social norms and values that 
the ‘civil’ must exert on the military institution of the UN. This military institution is also a 
different configuration than in our other cases, as each military for UN missions is formed for that 
specific mission. This does not fit in to the traditional idea of a state military institution, but instead 
becomes a supra-national military institution, which should be controlled by the civil power that is 
the UN Charter. Thus, the civil-military relations in this case should be seen as the relations 
between the UN as an institution, and the military that is formed for this specific mission.  
As the UN is a different constellation than a normal sovereign state, or a private company, their 
control of force is also different. From what we have examined in the above section, the UN seems 
to have a tighter grip on the control of force than what we saw in Iraq, for example.  
In terms of the doxic battles of this field, what is at stake is not the right to exercise violence in this 
case, as it has been in the other cases, but rather the right to challenge the way the UN operates. 
This means that what is being challenged, is the norms and practices of how the UN operates within 
a country, and the challengers of that orthodoxy in this case are the PMSCs, who have then succeed 
in making their resources, or forms of capital, legitimate. This, then, has changed the doxa to a more 
heterodoxic one, exemplifying that the PMSCs, in this case, possess symbolic power. Nevertheless, 
the sheer volume of capital and its strength in exercising symbolic power is making it difficult to 
Page	  62	  of	  82	  	  
challenge the doxa of the UN, and the case of PMSCs in the East Timor operation is seemingly no 
exception. As such, the doxa of the UN is not necessarily being challenged by the rise of PMSCs, 
though, they are utilizing the new options that PMSCs bring with them regarding to carry out an 
operation like the one in East Timor. A major factor in this case, though, is the tasks the PMSCs 
carry out. The lack of use of force needed to carry out their given tasks, diminish the challenge 
PMSCs impose on the doxa of the UN.  
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9  Discussion 
In the following section, we will combine the main points from each case-analysis, and discuss 
them in relation to our research question. 
 
To discuss the second part of the question, we are going to incorporate ideas of norm change, based 
on the definitions presented in chapter 3 as part of the theoretical framework. We will then discuss 
these findings in terms of the possible consequences of change in territory, authority and rights. 
Furthermore, a combination of Finnemore & Sikkink’s terms and Sassen’s concepts leads to a 
discussion on states’ new role in a normative perspective on monopoly on violence. Where Sassen 
would argue that a new ordering could coexist with existing orderings, Finnemore and Sikkink 
seem to suggest that a replacement of norms is happening. However, they both agree that a 
consequence of such change will have a great impact on civil-military relations, creating a more 
complex configuration of the civil, military, and corporate. 
Common for all three case-analyses, is that they all take place in the post Cold War period, within 
weak states experiencing high levels of conflict and insecurity. In Nigeria, the state has very little 
control over the unrest in the country, creating a void in the security, which the PMSCs then fill. In 
Iraq, the US invasion brought with it a removal of the existing polity, creating a territory within 
which the PMSCs can operate only with oversight from the American state. In East Timor, the 
country did not have a state before the UN mission came to build one, or at least not one that was 
recognized by the UN. Another common trait of all three cases is that multiple PMSCs operate in 
these conflict zones, which have all been hired by outside entities, be it foreign private companies, 
an invading state or an international organization. These entities all seem to have some degree of 
interest in the conflicted territory, be it economical, cultural-political, humanitarian, or a mixture.  
 
Despite these commonalities, each case differs significantly from one another in terms of how 
symbolic capital is obtained. In the private case, the Nigerian state is weak on all forms of capital – 
also the capital of physical force, which is the kind of circumstances where PMSCs seem to thrive 
under. This also entails that PMSCs have the potential to accumulate more symbolic power, and 
that way become more powerful than the Nigerian state, which one could argue has already 
happened. This means that the Nigerian state loses its symbolic monopoly on violence, by 
outsourcing security tasks to PMSCs. In the state case, the US also outsources violence to PMSCs, 
but because the US is a strong state, this has a different effect on the US’ monopoly on violence and 
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symbolic power, where one could argue that the US can afford to outsource parts of this monopoly, 
as it has a very high degree of symbolic capital. In the international case there was no sovereign 
state that the UN could challenge when it went into East Timor, so the outsourcing of violence is 
from the UN, as a supra-sovereign, to the PMSCs it employed to assist UN troops. Because the UN 
has a high level of symbolic capital, its authority is not affected to the same degree as with states 
within the international financial system. Another important aspect is that the UN (in this case) only 
uses PMSCs for non-violent assignments, such as logistics, and therefore does not outsource 
violence in the traditional sense. The aspect of maintaining physical force is essential in holding on 
to symbolic power.  
 
In regards to the first part of our research question, we see that in each case, there are differences in 
how and why civil-military relations are affected. In the private case, the Nigerian state, being a 
weak state, has had to outsource its monopoly on violence in order to keep companies in the 
country, which then has created a link between holders of economic capital and rights. Contrary, in 
the state case, we see how the American state, a strong state, has chosen to outsource its monopoly 
on violence, in line with its neoliberal agenda, and has in some terms shown to improve the 
military’s functional imperative. These two cases showcase the difference of whether the state 
outsourcing its monopoly on violence is a weak or strong state, and whether the outsourcing comes 
as a result of willingness or of necessity. In the case of the UN, the outsourcing has not been of 
specifically monopoly on violence, and thus the doxa of the UN has not been challenged in the 
same way by PMSCs. In combination with the fact that the UN also is a strong actor, which can 
choose whether to outsource its monopoly on violence, the UN holds a strong position in a doxic 
battle with the PMSCs, whereas the Nigerian state is forced to accept the heterodoxy of the PMSCs.   
 
With these main points in mind, we move on to discuss whether there has been a norm change, 
especially with focus on a neoliberal (doxic) development towards a global privatization of security. 
For this discussion, we return to Finnemore and Sikkinks definitions of norm change presented in 
chapter 3, with a focus on three essential levels: emergence, cascade, and internalization.  
We see international and domestic norms as interrelated, so if a norm changes on one level, it 
affects the other. This idea also relates to Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power and the 
relationship between total volume of accumulated capital and doxic impact (see 4.2.), a 
phenomenon we have called doxic spillover-effect. Furthermore, this idea can also be linked to 
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Sassen, because she argues that globalization are interrelated at all levels, ranging from global to 
local. Still, the state plays a central role in the shaping of globalization since the state facilitates the 
transition from local to global. Thus, the state becomes the central agent when it comes to the 
spreading of new orderings. This makes sense as symbolic capital always leads back to the state, 
and thus without a state you cannot have symbolic power etc. 
We look at regulative norms, which order and restrict behavior, and can be seen as a further 
development of the Bourdieusian concept of doxa and the doxic battles. These might lead to norm 
change, in the form of a shift in power and authority. One might argue that the states monopoly on 
violence, as part of its sovereignty, is a regulative norm, emphasizing how the use of force is bound 
to the state alone. However, Sassen argues that the emergence of new orderings does not necessarily 
replace existing orderings, but definitely creates normative challenges to existing orderings. When 
we compare the terminology of Sassen and norm change-theory, we do realize that there is a 
theoretical difference between ‘orderings’ and ‘norms’. ‘Orderings’ can exist in multiplicity 
whereas ‘norms’, in its own sense of the word, cannot.  
When applying the three stages of norm change (norm emergence, norm cascade and norm 
internalization) (see chapter 3.3) to the three case analyses, one must first identify a norm 
emergence, which common for all three cases can be related back to the rise of neoliberalism, with 
an emphasis on privatization of public goods since the end of the Cold War. This rise of neoliberal 
values is associated with the Western world, and especially the US, which then can be seen as a 
norm entrepreneur in this area. The US has, because of their dominant position within the field of 
international security and politics, succeeded in propagating its neoliberal doxa and is highly 
capable of making weak states submit to this doxa, which in the case of Nigeria is what the PMSCs 
fight for in the doxic battle (see also Lerner & Coleman 1968:387).  
According to Krahman, norms are always in the process of being (re)defined by norm entrepreneurs 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). When it comes to international security norms, these ‘first movers’ 
have been powerful states or actors that have lead the way for others to follow, like the US and the 
UN. The norm entrepreneurs’ need symbolic power through symbolic capital, which both the US 
and the UN has a high level of.  
One way, in which it can be argued that the US has acted as a norm entrepreneur, is the way it has 
created and promoted the neoliberal norm of privatizing security. The US’ first-mover history in 
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terms of establishing, employing and promoting PMSCs externally by using these in especially Iraq 
as presented in the state case, is what makes the US norm entrepreneurs, in terms of being one of 
the strongest promoters of the use of PMSCs. This has also helped legitimize the use of PMSCs, 
due to the US’ high status in the international society.  In the private case, one can see how this 
tendency in privatization of security, has spread to other Western based companies, such as Shell, 
which employs primarily UK based PMSCs for security operations in Nigeria. This shows that the 
US has succeeded in ‘socializing’ other states into promoting the new norm. This statement is also 
confirmed by the state case, which shows how the US uses PMSCs in Iraq, which is a war fought by 
the Coalition of the Willing, meaning that many other states are involved in the insurgency of Iraq, 
and therefore intentionally or unintentionally approves of, and even uses, PMSCs, through 
alignment with the US.  
In the international case, the UN (as a supra body of states), also acts as a promoter of this norm 
emergence as well as norm entrepreneur, as it employs PMSCs in its UN-peace keeping mission in 
East Timor. Despite the fact that they were primarily used for non-violent tasks, the UN still 
validates the role of PMSCs in international security. Because the UN consist of many member 
states, utilizing PMSCs in UN missions automatically makes all the UN members states norm 
‘bandwagoners’, because what the UN does can be seen as an expression of their collective will. It 
can be said that the UN deploys the US doxa, which makes the member states forced into doxic 
submission.  
The last criteria in norm change are norm internalization, which happens when the heterodoxic 
norm that challenges the orthodoxic norm triumphs and a doxic submission occurs. In this case the 
states’ monopoly on violence submits to the neoliberal privatization of security. One could argue 
that such a global doxic submission is in the making, as the US, through their dominant position, 
has succeeded in establishing their neoliberal doxa as the orthodoxy. 
To address the third part of our research question, regarding the consequences of it all, we will look 
closer at Sassen’s theory as described in 3.2, and as well as in 4.2. The introduction of PMSCs in 
the global world of security seemingly has had an impact on the configuration of the public-private 
relation, and also on the civil-military relations. The impact can be measured on different levels, 
which is exemplified through our three cases. At the private level, the introduction of PMSCs has 
led to a shift in the balance of legitimate capital in the relation between the public and private. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Nigerian state cannot provide sufficient security, or even maintain a 
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sovereign authority, in some parts of the country tells us that the state is weak in terms of symbolic 
power. And when the international companies described in the private case demanded the provision 
of security in return of economic capital, the state accepted an outsourcing of its executive branch in 
form of acceptance of PMSCs. Thus, the fact that the private (and foreign) companies hold more 
economic capital facilitates an emergence of a new ordering in the Nigerian security sector. This 
new ordering challenges the old configuration of civil-military relations within Nigeria, though does 
not replace it. As discussed in 4.2, an outsourcing of the executive branch within a weak state (a 
weak legislative branch) not only reconfigures the civil-military relation but also alters the relation 
between authority and rights. This happens by creating a greater distance between the citizens and 
the executive branch of the government, formed by privatization of security. In the Nigerian case, 
this means that security suddenly becomes enhanced, and maybe even exclusive, for those who 
possess economic capital. Thusly, rights of the Nigerian citizens are changed as a new security 
order within the country is challenging the older ordering of security as a public good.  
Weak state is not a connotation that you can apply to neither the United States nor the United 
Nations in the two other cases. However, as previously mentioned, we regard both as a form of 
norm-entrepreneurs which in turn also has had consequences for their respective civil-military 
relations. When we look at the US case, we see an example on the three aspects of globalization, in 
accordance with the theory outlined in 3.2. First, a disassembly of the state, enabled by the 
neoliberal agenda, has transferred parts of the tasks previously thought of as exclusive of the state to 
the private, in form of outsourcing of parts of the military to private companies. Second, the 
development of capacities, which relates to developing the private actors to become globalized, was 
facilitated by the war in Iraq, where the US found itself in a need of an infusion of troops without 
angering an already pessimistic public. Third, the reassembly created a new security field in which 
the use of PMSCs was accepted to carry out tasks on behalf of the military. The global norm 
change, that we argue has happened within the global security field, mirrors this reassembly. The 
UN case shows how the UN also helped this reassembly reach global proportions through their 
strength in symbolic capital. 
As such, in terms of consequences, both the case of the US and the UN are quite different from the 
one in Nigeria. When talking about the United States, the reassembly of the security field has meant 
a reconfiguration of both public and private relations as well as civil-military relations, as the lines 
in both instances has been blurred. However, in contrast to the Nigerian case, the reconfiguration 
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happens on a national level and internally in the state-apparatus. Whilst the line between public and 
private has been blurred with a partly, and small, outsourcing of the executive branch that is the 
military, the authority still lies within the state as the PMSCs are incorporated into the US command 
structure, or at least that was the case in Iraq. This also pertains to the UN case. However, there is 
still created a greater distance between the citizens and the executive branch in terms of 
accountability, at least when it comes to PMSCs, which might have an influence on the rights of 
citizens. However, the American state holds a great deal of symbolic capital and as such is still 
holder of the monopoly on symbolic power, thus, there seems to be no real change in authority 
despite the outsourcing of violence. Therefore, the strength of the state seemingly has a great say in 
how the introduction of PMSCs have an influence on the consequence for the rights of citizens.   
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10 Conclusion 
 
In this project we have answered the following research question: 
How does the use of PMSCs influence the civil-military relations, and can this be seen as a global 
norm change in the state’s monopoly on violence, and if so, what are the possible consequences of 
such changes? 
Through our analysis of each of our cases, and based on our findings, we establish the argument 
that a global normative move towards privatization of security through outsourcing of the state’s 
monopoly on violence has developed. Our three cases are used to build up this argument, based on 
different levels of securitization: private, state, and international. In terms of civil-military relations, 
we see how the control of force functions differently in the three cases, depending on the strength of 
the state. 
We have found that weak states (with less symbolic power) are more heavily affected by normative 
changes, encouraged by strong actors such as the US and UN. We saw this in the first case, where a 
de-monopolization of symbolic power has begun, raising the question of who is in charge of the 
country’s political affairs. Thus, these effects also influence the state’s authority and the citizen’s 
rights. In the second case, we saw how a strong state choosing to outsource their monopoly on 
violence had very different results. The doxic battle between the state and the PMSCs did not 
consist of a battle over symbolic power, but rather a ‘battle’ to balance the degree of privatization, 
so that the US could maintain a dominant position as the holder of monopoly on symbolic power, 
while following their neoliberal doxa of privatization. In the third case, we saw how the UN 
followed this same doxa, as well as how they, as a strong actor, were not affected in the same way 
as the Nigerian state, which was also linked to the fact that the UN did not outsource violence 
specifically. 
Generally, it is this neoliberal doxa which is being spread globally, and which blurs the lines 
between public and private power. We see a general favoring of economic capital, which is then 
equal to power and political influence, meaning symbolic power (to shape the world).  
But while this blurring does occur, the authority still lies with the state. We see this in how the 
PMSCs are incorporated into the command structure, like in the second case with the US. There is, 
however, a still greater distance between the citizens and the polity when it comes to accountability 
of the PMSCs, which might compromise the rights of citizens.  
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Conclusively, the strength of the state seems to play a large role in the reconfiguration of civil-
military relations when PMSCs are introduced.   
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